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I. INTRODUCTION
William Prosser described warranty as "a freak hybrid born of the
illicit intercourse of tort and contract."1 If that be so, it is not hyper-
bole to characterize the implied warranty of workmanlike perform-
ance2 as the dysfunctional offspring of this illicit intercourse. Despite
virtual universal adoption of the warranty of workmanlike perform-
ance by English and American jurisprudence, it remains an amor-
phous concept avoiding precise conceptualization. The absence of a
precise formulation has created uncertainty as to the warranty's doc-
1. William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 800 (1966).
2. The concept which will be referred to in this discussion as the implied warranty
of workmanlike performance has also been described by such terms as: "[duty] to
perform in a workmanlike manner," Reliable Elec. Co. v. Clinton Campbell Con-
tractor, Inc., 459 P.2d 98, 101 (Ariz. App. 1969); "duty to perform with that degree
of skill or workmanship which is possessed by those of ordinary skill in the par-
ticular trade," Watts Home, Inc. v. Alonzo, 452 So. 2d 1331, 1332 (Ala. Civ. App.
1984); "duty to do the work in careful and workmanlike manner," National Fire
Ins. Co. v. Westgate Constr. Co., 227 F. Supp. 835, 837 (D. Del. 1964); "[duty to
perform in] a reasonably diligent, skillful, workmanlike, and adequate manner,"
Previews v. Everets, 94 N.E.2d 267, 268 (Mass. 1950); "obligation to perform work
with skill and care," Gaybis v. Palm, 93 A.2d 269, 272 (Md. 1952); and, "obligation
to perform in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike manner," Gosselin v. Better
Homes, Inc., 256 A.2d 629 (Me. 1969).
See Michael M. Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-
Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 661, 667
(identifying the varied terminology employed to describe the concept of an im-
plied warranty of workmanlike performance).
[Vol. 72:981
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trinal dimensions. This in turn has produced unpredictable and une-
ven judicial application of the doctrine.
Today the warranty of workmanlike performance often performs
functions radically different from those contemplated by early courts
which embraced it in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. Indeed, in certain instances the warranty is perceived not as a
gap filler or default rule, but as a duty which is independent of the
parties' agreement and supports the imposition of tort liability.3
Changing formulations of the theoretical nature of the warranty have
expanded its applicability beyond traditional parameters. As noted
above, this transformation has manifested most prominently in the
evolution of the warranty from a contractually premised doctrine to a
hybrid tort. In short, these divergent formulations and the concomi-
tant inconsistent body of law which they have produced warrant
closer examination of the warranty of workmanlike performance.
A. Previous Scholarly Examinations
This article attempts to transcend previous analyses which have fo-
cused principally on the warranty's use of negligence related princi-
ples as a means of determining contractual rights and obligations.4 To
this end, the obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner has been
formulated as "an implied warranty not to be negligent."5 Accord-
ingly, liability hinges on a service provider's failure to exercise the
care and skill that a reasonably prudent and skilled person would have
exercised under similar circumstances. 6 Adopting this view, one com-
mentator remarked that
[t]he proof of negligence requirement markedly distinguishes this professional
3. See discussion accompanying notes 197-215, infra.
4. A number of commentators have made this observation. Comment, Guidelines
for Extending Implied Warranties to Service Markets, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 365, 393
(1976)(the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance is a rule of
negligence on which the liability of the service provider is premised on proof of
its negligent rendering of services); Bruce A. Singal, Extending Implied Warran-
ties Beyond Goods: Equal Protection for Consumers of Services, 12 NEw ENG. L.
REv. 859, 911 (1977)(the concept of the implied warranty of good and workman-
like performance borrows warranty language to express a standard based on neg-
ligence); John P. MacPhee, Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Performance-
In Absence of Nonassignability Clause in Contrac Contractor Not Immunized
from Contractual Obligation to Perform Work in Workmanlike, Non-Negligent
Manner, 15 SnTON HALL L. REv. 710, 712 (1985)(concluding negligence is neces-
sary to establish breach of the implied warranty of good and workmanlike per-
formance which gives rise to a contract action).
5. Greenfield, supra note 2, at 666.
6. Id. Similarly, the workmanlike performance obligation has been uniformly ac-
knowledged as dissimilar to a "true" warranty (such as the UCC warranty of
merchantability) inasmuch as liability depends on conduct. Refer to text accom-
panying notes 116-120, infra for further discussion of the warranty of workman-
like performance as an "in process" rather than an "end result" concept.
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standard from that employed for implied warranties. Sometimes the standard
borrows implied warranty language, as in implied warranties of workmanlike
performance of competence and ability... and the use of ordinary or reason-
able skill and care. Close analysis of these standards, however, reveals that
they are actually negligence standards cloaked in misleading implied war-
ranty terms. 7
Such broad propositions effectively describe the immediately ascer-
tainable features and consequences of the workmanlike performance
warranty, particularly its distinction from traditional notions of war-
ranty. Yet they fall short of enhancing our understanding of the con-
cept's fundamental substantive nature. Sparse guidance is, therefore,
provided for resolving the conceptual and practical questions stem-
rning from incorporation of the workmanlike performance obligation
into agreements. Moreover, generalized conclusions tend to avoid crit-
ical discourse concerning the uncertainties which lie at the heart of a
concept which is premised on contract but which relies in part on tort
principles.8
The reasons underlying the dearth of critical examination of a con-
cept deeply etched into English and American law are unclear. The
concept's historical acceptance and application may have ladened it
with an aura of antiquity which has served too successfully to shield it
7. Singal, supra note 4, at 911-912. In an effort to determine the origins of the use of
warranty language to describe this concept, Professor Greenfield suggests that
implied warranty terminology may have been employed to express a negligence
concept because the cause of action for negligent performance of services arises
from a contractual undertaking. Greenfield, supra note 2, at 665.
8. The incongruence between tort and contract in the context of the workmanlike
performance warranty is readily observable inasmuch as negligence concepts aid
in determining breach of the obligation. Such a proposition appears inapposite to
the general rule of strict liability in the performance of contractual obligations.
Generally, contractual duties are voluntarily undertaken by parties and be-
come activated only as a result of the parties' private agreement. E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1990); G. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 1
(7th ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). Therefore con-
tract law provides the legal mechanism to protect the expectations arising from
these voluntary exchanges. FARNSWORTH, supra, at 3-4. Because the nonbreach-
ing party will be compensated for the loss of his bargain created by the exchange
wholly irrespective of the breaching party's fault or notice, contract liability can
be seen as a form of strict liability. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEF,
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 92, at 664 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988)[hereinafter
KEErON, ET AL.].
Tort, on the other hand, is generally defined as a legal wrong committed upon
the person or the property of another; it occurs independent of any contractual
undertaking between the parties. Id. § 92, 655. In contrast to contractually im-
posed duties, tort duties are imposed by the state as a matter of social policy. Id.
§ 92, 656-57. Consequently, tort liability is dependent on the failure unreasonably
to conform to a socially imposed standard of care. Tort duty and liability there-
fore is typically imposed independent of and without regard to any exchange rela-
tionship. Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity
Requirement: Once More into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REv. 9, 18 (1987).
[Vol. 72:981
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from close critical analysis.9 In this vein, perhaps the implied war-
ranty of workmanlike performance constitutes the type of legal
maxim which is first established as precedent and accepted as such by
succeeding generations but escapes "rigorous scrutiny as to its raison
d'etre."10
Whatever the reason, subjecting the warranty of workmanlike per-
formance to comprehensive analysis is acutely appropriate given the
persistent uncertainties which accompany it. More specifically, engag-
ing in critical discourse regarding the concept may aid in assessing the
wisdom and utility of the transformation which has occurred in cer-
tain contexts. This discourse will also test the soundness of expanding
the warranty's applicability to factual situations dissimilar from those
in which it historically has been applied.
The debate concerning expansion of the concept is illustrated by
the development of the implied warranty of workmanlike perform-
ance in Texas. The reach of the warranty expanded significantly
when the Texas Supreme Court held in Melody Homes Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Barnes, that a service provider impliedly warrants, to con-
sumers suing under the state's consumer protection statute, to repair
or modify existing tangible goods or property in a good and workman-
like manner.11 The decision in Melody Homes brought into focus a
number of unresolved issues concerning the scope and function of the
warranty of workmanlike performance.
Predominant among the unresolved issues is the type of services
which fall within the parameters of the workmanlike performance
warranty. For instance, intermediate Texas courts have reached in-
consistent conclusions on the issue of whether the warranty applies to
professional service providers. Thus the warranty of workmanlike
performance has been extended to apply to services rendered by archi-
tects12 and developers.13 However, expansion of the warranty has
9. See Singal, supra note 4, at 911-12.
10. Id. at 911-12 (reaching the same conclusions with respect to the well established
standard of care for professional services). Indeed the warranty of workmanlike
performance like the professional standard of care seems to have been applied
"like rote by American courts for the better part of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries." Id.
11. 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987). The court reasoned that policy consideration
warranted extension of an implied warranty concept to the above described trans-
actions. The court emphasized the following public policy considerations: the
public interest in protecting consumers from inferior services; the greater capa-
bility of a seller to prevent losses caused by the rendering of improper services;
the right of consumers to rely on a service provider's expertise; and a service
provider's better ability to absorb costs of inferior services. Id. at 353-54.
12. White Budd Van Ness Partnership v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture, 798
S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App. 1990). In White Budd, the court invited the Texas
Supreme Court to consider the question it explicitly left open in Melody Homes-
whether the warranty it created applied to professional service providers. In Mel-
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:981
been greeted with hostility by courts in a group of cases which have
rejected application of the warranty in situations involving the provi-
sion of medical,14 property management,'5 and real estate brokerage
services. 16
The debate in Texas and other jurisdictions regarding the scope of
the workmanlike performance warranty is traceable to uncertainty
surrounding the substantive basis of the concept and thus its doctrinal
dimensions. This lack of clarity has generated inconsistent judicial de-
terminations regarding a number of issues, including whether the
warranty of workmanlike performance is an "in process" or "end re-
sult" concept.17 Other issues which impact parties' substantive and
procedural rights include whether the warranty's theoretical under-
pinnings lie in tort or contract,1 8 whether it is a concept which is in-
dependent of the implied warranty of habitability,19 what constitutes
breach of the warranty, and whether the concept is superfluous given
the availability of other tort and contract remedies.20
ody Homes, the court had stated that "[t]he question whether an implied war-
ranty applies to services in which the essence of the transaction is the exercise of
professional judgment by the service provider is not before us." 741 S.W.2d at 354.
13. Luker v. Arnold, 843 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App. 1992).
14. Chapman v. Paul R. Wilson, Jr. D.D.S., Inc., 826 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App. 1992). The
court held that since the essence of the transaction involved the exercise of pro-
fessional judgment, the warranty did not apply. Id. at 217-18. See also Eoff v. Hal
& Charlie Peterson Found., 811 S.W.2d 187, 196 (Tex. App. 1991); Wisenbarger v.
Gonzalez Warm Springs Rehabilitation Hosp., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 688, 691 (Tex. App.
1990).
15. Forestpark Enters., Inc. v. Culpepper, 754 S.W.2d 775, 778-79 (Tex. App. 1988).
16. Kubinsky v. Van Zandt Realtors, 811 S.W.2d 711, 715-16 (Tex. App. 1991).
17. In Melody Homes the court explained that the warranty it created was one con-
cerned with performance and not the end result. It stated "[w]e do not require
repairmen to guarantee the results of their work; we only require [them] ... to
perform those services in a good and workmanlike manner." Melody Homes Mfg.
Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex. 1987). Recently, the Fifth Circuit had
occasion to address this issue and held, applying Texas law, that the warranty of
workmanlike performance focuses on performance and not end results. City
Pub. Serv. Bd. v. General Elec. Co., 947 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1991).
For a more comprehensive discussion of the "in process/end result" distinc-
tion see text accompanying notes 116-120, infra.
18. In Melody Homes, the Texas Supreme Court indicated that the concept was
grounded more in tort than in contract. The court held that "[a]n implied war-
ranty arises by the operation of law when public policy so mandates." 741 S.W.2d
349, 355 (Tex. 1987). This position was buttressed by the court's refusal (in dic-
tum) to permit disclaimer of the warranty. Id. at 355. Perhaps this conclusion is
appropriate given that the court expanded the scope of the warranty only after
careful consideration of public policy reasons for so doing. However, as discussed
below, absent this type of judicial analysis, characterizing the warranty as more
tort than contract may not be conceptually justifiable. See text accompanying
notes 216-227, infra.
19. Refer to text accompanying notes 121-147, infra.
20. Consideration of the latter two issues are beyond the scope of the present discus-
sion. Reserving analysis of these issues until a later day is not intended to in any
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B. Constructing a Conceptual Framework
The purpose of this article is to provide a conceptual framework
for addressing the varied conceptual and practical issues evoked by the
warranty of workmanlike performance. In the process of articulating
this framework, the article attempts to better define the theoretical
and practical dimensions of the warranty. An inevitable consequence
of this undertaking is the examination of the extent to which current
formulations of the warranty comport with or depart from traditional
contract and tort principles. Therefore, to a considerable degree, the
following discussion contrasts expansive formulations of the warranty
of workmanlike performance with approaches which not only adhere
more closely to the original premises of the concept, but which also
recognize doctrinal distinctions between tort and contract.
This article begins by tracing the warranty of workmanlike per-
formance to its English and American origins. This historical retro-
spective aids in uncovering the theoretical premises on which the
warranty is founded. Early cases establish fairly conclusively that the
warranty was developed to accomplish a two-fold objective-to effec-
tuate the undisclosed hypothetical intentions of the parties and to pro-
mote justice.21 Following a discussion of the theories of implied in fact
and implied in law,22 the article proposes that the proper characteriza-
tion of the warranty of workmanlike performance is as a gap filler or
default rule. It thus constitutes a background rule which governs the
manner of performance when parties to a contract for services fail to
specify a standard of performance.23
The discussion next illustrates the manner in which the fusion of
negligence and contract has contributed to the transformation of the
workmanlike performance obligation from a gap filler or default rule
to a hybrid tort. The article examines decisions in which it becomes
apparent that in certain instances the warranty is formulated so that it
not only functions in ways other than those originally contemplated
but also operates contrary to traditional contract concepts and the
commercial realities of the contracting process.24
The article reaches the foregoing conclusions by examining impor-
tant doctrinal developments surrounding the warranty in the context
of two issues. First, is the warranty of workmanlike performance in-
dependent and distinct from the warranty of habitability? Second,
under what circumstances should breach of the warranty give rise to
contract, tort or contract and tort remedies? After examining current
way devalue their significance. Indeed, attempting initially to define the doctri-
nal dimensions of the concept may facilitate the analysis of these issues.
21. See text accompanying notes 93-106, infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 54-77, infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 78-92, infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 197-227, infra.
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judicial approaches to these issues, the article evaluates them pursu-
ant to a gap filler conceptualization. The article concludes that the
proposed gap filler/default rule formulation, at a minimum, identifies
policy factors worthy of consideration in resolving the myriad concep-
tual problems accompanying the warranty of workmanlike perform-
ance. 25 Eventually such a formulation may reduce uncertainty
concerning the concept's doctrinal content and clarify the scope of its
application.
II. ORIGINS OF THE WARRANTY OF WORKMANLIKE
PERFORMANCE
A. Historical Recognition
1. English Recognition
The historical roots of the implied warranty of workmanlike per-
formance are traceable to early nineteenth century English cases
which implicitly acknowledged an obligation to perform in a work-
manlike manner. The first of these cases, Basten v. Butter,26 involved
a carpenter's action in assumpsit to recover for services provided on a
farm. The farmer asserted, as a defense, that the carpenter had per-
formed in a "very improper and insufficient manner."27 The court
held that evidence showing that the work was improperly executed
could be proffered to defeat plaintiffs claim.28
Shortly after Basten, more explicit recognition was given to an ob-
ligation to perform services in a workmanlike manner. In Duncan v.
Blundell,29 a plaintiff seeking payment for services rendered in erect-
ing a stove was denied relief. In reaching this determination, the court
imposed a duty on the workman to exercise good judgment in carrying
out the services purchased by his employer. Central to the court's de-
cision was the notion that the workman's improper performance re-
gulted in his failure to deliver that for which defendant had
bargained.30 Of particular relevance to the outcome was the court's
perception that the service recipient's reliance on the service pro-
vider's expertise was integral to the exchange relationship between
the parties.31 Duncan is cited as authority for the implication of a
25. See text accompanying notes 216-227, infra.
26. 103 Eng. Rep. 185 (1806).
27. Id. at 186.
28. Id. at 188.
29. 171 Eng. Rep. 749 (1820).
30. Id.
31. This perception supported the court's conclusion that a service provider who
holds himself out as capable of rendering services of a specific nature impliedly
warrants that he possesses the requisite level of skill and ability to successfully
complete work. The idea that a worker impliedly warrants that it possesses a
certain level of skill was more fully explored in Harmer v. Cornelius, 141 Eng.
[Vol. 72:981
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term to perform service contracts in a workmanlike manner despite
the court's failure to explicitly create such an obligation.32
The concept of a warranty of workmanlike performance which im-
pliedly arises in service contracts was more explicitly articulated in
Cousins v. Paddon.33 There the court acknowledged the propriety of
implying into "every special contract for work and labor a duty that
the work shall be done in a good and workmanlike manner."34 In ex-
pressly denominating this implied obligation as an implied warranty of
workmanlike performance, the court noted an important consequence
of a failure to comply with the warranty-it provides justification for
nonpayment on the contract by the service recipient.35 Thus by the
middle of the nineteenth century,3 6 the principle of an implied war-
Rep. 94 (1958). There the court held that "[w]hen a skilled labourer, artisan, or
artist is employed, there is on his part an implied warranty that he is of skill
reasonably competent to the task he undertakes." Id. at 98.
32. Reliance on Duncan for this proposition seems appropriate, however, given that
implicit in the decision is the notion that a service provider who fails to perform
in a workmanlike manner through either negligence or the absence of the requi-
site skill commits a breach of contract.
Basten v. Butter and Duncan v. Blundell are recognized in English law as the
seminal cases implying a workmanlike performance obligation into contracts for
work and labor. In Young and Marten, Ltd. v. McManus Childs, Ltd., 2 All E.R.
1169 (1968), the court cited to Duncan v. Blundell as providing early recognition
and support for the principle of an implied term to perform services in a work-
manlike manner. In Cousins v. Paddon, 150 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (1835) Basten was
identified as the source of this rule. See 4 HAIsBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 593
(1974) (citing Duncan as authority for the rule that implied into every service con-
tract is a term to perform work in a good and workmanlike manner).
33. 150 Eng. Rep. 234 (1835).
34. Id. at 235. The court noted this principle had been established as precedence
since the case of Basten v. Butter. Express recognition of an implied term to per-
form in a workmanlike manner actually occurred several years prior to Cousins
in Lucas v. Godwin, 132 Eng. Rep. 595 (1837). Lucas is significant not only due to
the court's adoption of the warranty, but because of the insight the court's com-
ments lend to substantive theory on which the warranty of workmanlike per-
formance is grounded. These comments are discussed in the text accompanying
note 102, infra.
35. Cousins v. Paddon, 150 Eng. Rep. 234, 236 (1835). The Cousins conceptualization
of the implication of a term to perform in a workmanlike manner surfaced in
Pearce v. Tucker, 176 Eng. Rep. 61 (1862), an action where a workman agreed to
erect a kitchen range which had an old boiler situated behind it. The range failed
to work as constructed because hot water could not be transferred from the
boiler. Id. at 61. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for
defendant's failure to fit up a range in a proper and workmanlike manner. Id. at
62.
36. Apparently, recognition of the warranty of workmanlike performance proceeded
at a slower pace than other warranties such as the warranty of merchantability in
sales. This aspect of the history of the warranty was briefly discussed in Young
and Marten, Ltd. v. McManus Childs, Ltd., 2 All E.R. 1169, 1175-76 (1968). In
discussing the extent to which contractors warrant materials, the court noted
"'[i]f a man sells an article he thereby warrants it is merchantable.' Curiously
enough, however, there is no equal body of decision at common law in the nine-
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ranty of workmanlike performance had gained acceptance in English
law.37
2. American Recognition
The American judiciary's recognition of an implied warranty to
perform services in a workmanlike manner proceeded at a brisk pace
during the mid-nineteenth century. Somerby v. Tappan38 appears as
the earliest reported decision to implicitly acknowledge the existence
of such an obligation. In Somerby, the defendant contractor agreed to
construct a house for plaintiff.39 After completion of construction, the
chimney failed to carry smoke.40 Plaintiff complained the contractor
breached his agreement to construct the house in a workmanlike man-
ner notwithstanding the absence of an express stipulation in the
agreement so providing.41 The Ohio Supreme Court's charge to the
jury had the same operative effect as an express stipulation to perform
in a workmanlike manner. The approved instruction provided if a
"mechanic undertakes to bring to the performance of his work the
requisite skill of his profession, and if he does not, and fails, he is liable
for the consequences. In this case, the obligation was to build these
chimnies skillfully, according to the approved usage of the trade."42
Any uncertainty concerning the Ohio Supreme Court's intention to
imply an obligation of workmanlike performance into the contract dis-
appeared the following year when it once again considered the matter
of the defective chimney.43 The court held that when a contractor un-
dertakes to build a house, he impliedly agrees to perform in a work-
manlike manner and his failure to do so renders him liable for injuries
sustained by the owner.44
The Somerby court's explicit adoption of the foregoing principle
was followed by numerous other American courts in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. 45 Among such courts was the Penn-
teenth century to support, in express terms, a similar implied warranty in the
case of contracts for work and materials. But that a man who supplies his labour
or his labour and materials is subject to the same basic obligation cannot be
doubted." I& at 1176.
37. See text accompanying notes 102-106, infra for a discussion of the English view as
to the theoretical underpinnings of the concept.
38. 1833 Ohio 229.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 231. Following sixteen hours of deliberation during which they failed to
reach a verdict, the jury was discharged. Id.
43. Somerby v. Tappan, 1834 Ohio 570.
44. Id. at 572.
45. E.g., Byerly v. Kepley, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 35, 36-37 (1853)(trial court properly in-
structed jury that contractor could recover only if services were performed in a
workmanlike manner); Doster v. Brown, 25 Ga. 24, 27 (1858)(the law implies an
[Vol. 72:981
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sylvania Supreme Court which adopted the concept in an 1855 case
entitled Wade v. Haycock.46 In this matter,47 involving the alleged
improper erection of a grist-mill, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ap-
proved the trial court's jury charge that "[w]here one contracts to do
all the millwright work necessary in the construction of a grist-mill,
he is bound to do it in a workmanlike manner, so that it will answer
the purpose for which it is intended."48
B. Theoretical Premises of the Warranty of Workmanlike Performance
The somewhat rapid pace at which American and, to a lesser ex-
tent, English courts embraced the implied warranty of workmanlike
performance was not matched by a clear articulation of the theoretical
premises on which the concept was founded. Therefore, it was not
uncommon to find judicial recognition of the warranty accompanied
by a less than enlightening statement that the warranty is implied into
agreements as a matter of law.49 Not surprisingly, mere enunciation
of this general proposition is of negligible value in enhancing under-
standing of the theoretical source of the warranty, its operative effect,
and any limitations imposed on its implication into agreements.
Having said this, it must in fairness be acknowledged that deter-
obligation to do faithful work into every contract); Springdale Cemetery Ass'n v.
Smith, 32 M. 252, 260 (1863); Smith & Nelson v. Bristol, 33 Iowa 24, 25
(1871) (holding it was proper to instruct jury that where contract is silent, contrac-
tor must perform work in workmanlike manner); Gillis v. Cobe, 177 Mass. 584
(1901); Taussig v. Wind, 71 S.W. 1095, 1097 (Mo. App. 1903); Bye v. George Mc-
Caulley & Son Co., 76 A. 621, 622 (Del. Super. Ct. 1908)(holding the law implies a
duty on the part of a contractor to perform in a workmanlike manner); Gwinnup
v. Shies, 69 N.E. 158 (Ind. 1903)(finding the failure of contractor to perform in
workmanlike manner may operate as a defense in action to recover for services);
Moss v. Best Knitting Mills, 130 S.E. 636, 637 (N.C. 1925)(finding that a builder
has an implied duty to perform in a workmanlike manner). See also cases cited in
note 78, infra.
46. 25 Pa. 382 (1855).
47. In Wade, the defendant designer of a mill procured the services of plaintiff to
erect the mill. When the work was completed, defendant refused to pay the con-
tract price based on the alleged failure of the mill to operate properly. Id. at 382-
83. Defendant argued that plaintiff's improper performance which resulted in
the failure of the promised consideration operated to bar plaintiff's requested re-
covery. Id.
48. Id. at 383. Elaborating on the consequences of plaintiff's alleged deficient work,
the court concluded improper performance entitled the plaintiff to recover under
the contract (if defects could be cured as offset by the damages resulting from the
deficient workmanship). Id.
49. See text accompanying note 78, infra. Also, to avoid overstatement, it should be
noted (as pointed out later in this discussion) that some early courts occasionally
elaborated on the meaning behind the proposition that the obligation arose or
was implied as a matter of law. It is the discussion by these courts which provide
particularly useful information on the theoretical source of the warranty of
workmanlike performance.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
mining the theoretical source of a concept is not necessarily an easy
task. Professor Prosser recognized the complexities inherent in ef-
forts aimed at uncovering a concept's theoretical source in his explora-
tion of the substantive underpinnings of the implied warranty of
merchantable quality in the sale of goods context. His analysis re-
vealed the emergence of three distinct theories as potential sources of
the warranty of quality: (a) misrepresentation of fact; (b) the warranty
as representing an unexpressed term assented to by the parties; and
(c) the warranty as implied into the agreement as a matter of law re-
gardless of the intentions of the parties.50 Professor Prosser reached
the conclusion that the warranty of merchantable quality rests, to
some extent, on all three of the above referenced theories.51
In contrast, early American courts most often based implication of
the workmanship warranty into service agreements on principles op-
erating under an implied in law theory.52 As the following discussion
reveals, regardless of the stated premise of the warranty, decisions
recognizing and applying it seldom seemed far removed from broader
policy considerations. Ascertaining the true meaning of statements
that the warranty of workmanlike performance arose as a matter of
law unlocks the door to its conceptualization. However, in order to
understand what courts meant in stating that the warranty arose as a
matter of law, it is necessary briefly to review the concepts embodied
in the terms "implied in law" and "implied in fact." As the following
discussion unfolds, it becomes apparent that the obligation to perform
in a workmanlike manner was originally conceived to operate as a gap
filler or default rule which was incorporated into service agreements
to define the performance obligations of the service provider. 53
1. Implied in Fact Terms
It is well established that courts will imply into agreements terms
which are necessary for the resolution of contractual rights and obliga-
tions.54 These implied terms are sometimes characterized as terms
50. William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L.
REV. 117, 122-24 (1943).
51. Id. at 124-25. Professor Prosser also noted, however, that courts most often
seemed to rely on implied in fact as providing the basis for decision.
Professor Prosser also emphasized the difficulties encountered in attempts to
differentiate between implied in fact and implied in law as providing the theory
on which a court had relied. Id. at 124. He further remarked that regardless of
the theory employed, policy considerations were seldom absent from warranty
cases and often controlled the decision. Id. As will be seen below, similar obser-
vations attach to the implied warranty of workmanlike performance. See text
accompanying notes 108-109, infra.
52. See discussion accompanying notes 78-92, infra.
53. See discussion accompanying notes 107-110, infra.
54. Helen Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The Sounds
of Silence, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 36 (1985). The process by which a court sup-
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"implied in fact."55 Implied in fact terms are said to differ from ex-
press contractual provisions in that the former are provided circum-
stantially while the latter are expressly stated.56 Thus an implied in
fact term can be fairly described as a contractual obligation inferred
from the intentions of the parties as manifested in the express terms
of the agreement, the parties' conduct, and other circumstances pres-
ent in a particular case.57
plies such a term has been characterized as "the process of implication." Id.; see
also 3A ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 562, at 286 (1960).
Some scholars have argued that the process courts engage in when supplying a
term is better described as a process of inference rather than implication. "The
method by which a court resolves a casus omissus, once it has determined that
there is one, can best be described as inference, a word that accurately refers to a
process by which the court derives its conclusions, as opposed to implication, a
word that unhappily attributes the result to the parties." E. Allan Farnsworth,
Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860, 876 (1968);
Glanville L. Williams, Language and the Law-IV., 61 LAW Q. REV. 384, 403
(1945) (arguing against designating the process as one of implication since it bears
less of a relationship to interpreting a pre-existing and expressed intent than it
does to amending or supplementing that intent which is expressly set forth).
This process of implication or inference has been primarily related to two
premises. First, courts will imply terms in an attempt to realize the actual expec-
tations of the parties. In the event actual expectation cannot be derived based
upon circumstances surrounding the transaction such as the language of the con-
tract, negotiations, course of dealings or usage of trade, resort must be made to
the second premise. E. Allan Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts,
68 COLUM. L. REv. 860 (1968). This latter premise "consists of basic principles of
fairness or justice which [a] court uses to extrapolate from the situations for
which the parties have provided to the casus omissus for which they have not."
Id. at 877. A third possible premise for the process of inference is the hypotheti-
cal reactions of the parties. In other words, a term is implied which the parties
would have incorporated into their agreement if they had anticipated the need
for such a term. Id. at 879. This premise has been criticized as contrived due to
the difficulty courts have in surmising what either or both parties would have
done if the situation would have been foreseen. Id.
55. Id. The notion of a term which is implied in fact has been alternatively character-
ized as a condition implied in fact-a term which the parties reasonably under-
stood but failed to express. W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The
Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. P=TT. L. REV. 21, 53-
54 (1984).
56. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 562, at 286-87; Prosser, supra note 50, at 123.
57. Prosser, supra note 50, at 123 (a term implied in fact is circumstantially proved);
Hadjiyannakis, supra note 54, at 38, 55 (a term implied in fact is derived as an
inference of the parties' actual intentions). English courts engage in a similar
process in incorporating implied in fact terms into agreements. Consistent with
the American view, implied in fact terms are viewed as those which the parties
reasonably intended to incorporate into their agreement but failed to expressly
set out. G. H. TREITE, supra note 8, at 158. In describing the concept and the
manner in which it is circumscribed by English courts, Professor Treitel states
"[t]he implication must be both obvious and 'necessary to give the transaction
such business efficacy as the parties must have intended."' Id. at 159.
Implied in fact terms-those which the parties categorize to be a part of their
agreement constitute the first of the three types of terms which may be implied
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2. Implied in Law
In contrast to the implied in fact concept, terms may be implied in
law notwithstanding uncertainty as to whether the parties would have
agreed to incorporate such terms into their agreement.5 8 These terms
which consequently operate independently of contractual consent
have traditionally been viewed as serving a gap filling function.5 9
Thus the implied in law or gap filler term60 is considered necessary for
into agreements. The second and third categories of implied terms are: terms
which the parties no doubt would have included if they had considered them; and
terms which are implied for reasons of fairness and justice. Hadjiyannanakis,
supra note 54, at 38, n.22. Terms falling into the second and third categories have
been described as terms "implied in law" or alternatively as "constructive condi-
tions." Id.; see 3A ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, §§ 632, 653 (1960).
Note, however, that determining whether an implied term rests on the first or
second and third premise is fraught with uncertainty. It has been said that
expectation shades into fairness or justice so that it is often hard to dis-
tinguish between the two. Since it may be difficult or impossible to tell
whether or not the parties were aware of a usage, by recourse to it
whether they were or not the court avoids the necessity of an inquiry
into the parties' actual expectations. More generalized standards of rea-
sonableness also help to form a bridge between actual expectation on the
one hand and fairness or justice on the other so that it is rarely necessary
to decide which of the two is being relied upon.
Farnsworth, supra note 54, at 877-78. See also CORBIN, supra note 54, at 280 (in
order to make a just decision, courts rarely need to distinguish between terms
implied in fact and implied in law).
58. CORBIN, supra note 56, at 286 (terms implied in law create duties irrespective of
the obligor's intentions or expressions); see Williams, supra note 54, at 401 (noting
that implied terms included terms courts imply based upon considerations of fair-
ness or policy irrespective of the intentions of parties to an agreement); Hadjiyan-
nakis, supra note 54, at 41 n.34 (implied in law obligations constitute contractual
obligations even though they are not strictly premised on intention; references to
intent are reduced to meaning the absence of a manifestation of intent to the
contrary).
See also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contrac-
tual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 822 (1992). Professor Barnett argues that im-
plied in law terms (which he characterizes as default rules) tend to undermine
support for a consensual basis of contract. Id. at 822. He also notes, however, that
while such rules are not the product of expressed or implied-in-fact consent, par-
ties often indirectly consent to them by not contracting around them. Id. at 826,
861.
59. Barnett, supra note 58, at 822 (stating "[m]uch of what is taught as the law of
contract can be conceived as publicly provided 'background' rules or principles
that fill the inevitable gaps in the private law made by contracting parties"); Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989)(noting that default rules fill the
gaps which exist within incomplete contracts).
60. Hadjiyannakis, supra note 54, at 39 n.25 (noting that terms imposed by law can be
alternatively characterized as "constructive" terms, "gap fillers" or "rules" of
law). See discussion in note 69, infra identifying other terminology used to con-
vey the concept of non-assent premised terms.
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resolving contractual rights and obligations.61 As alluded to above, it
has been long recognized that these gap filler or implied in law terms
are imposed for reasons of principle or policy and any notion that they
are based on assent is fictitious.62
Different terminology is often employed to define the process by
which courts imply terms into an agreement irrespective of intent. In-
61. Focusing on the import of implied terms to determine rights in duties, Section 204
of the Restatement (Second) of Contract provides: "[w]hen the parties to a bar-
gain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term
which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
oND) OF CONTRAcTs § 204 (1979)(emphasis added).
As noted previously, whether a term is implied in law or fact is difficult to
ascertain. See Hadjiyannakis, supra note 54, at 38-39; see also 3 CORBIN, supra
note 54, § 561, at 280 (commenting that distinguishing between the categories of
implied terms is often not required in order for a court to resolve a particular
dispute and reach a just decision). Refer to note 57, supra for further discussion
of the difficulties involved in distinguishing between implied in fact and implied
in law terms.
62. Barnett, supra note 58, at 826. ('Terms supplied by default rules are not a prod-
uct of the express or implied-in-fact consent of the parties as these two notions
have traditionally been understood, and may therefore be considered genuinely
implied-in-law"); Slawson, supra note 55, at 54 (conditions implied in law are sup-
plied by courts in the interest of justice notwithstanding an absence of consent);
Hadjiyannakis, supra note 54, at 41 n.34.
In commenting on the importance of default rules or gap fillers, Professors
Goetz and Scott comment that "a key purpose of state-supplied terms is to save
parties from the necessity of formulating a complete set of express conditions for
contingencies that may be difficult to anticipate, or are at least easily overlooked.
Thus, many of the general rules of contract, such as those of impossibility and
excuse, impose constructive conditions that reduce incompleteness risks."
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis
of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv.
261, 270 (1985).
Professor Barnett criticizes the use of default or gap-filler terms to the extent
they are imposed and thereby disregard the consent of the contracting parties.
He proposes replacing the traditional dichotomy of expressed or implied in fact
contract terms and implied in law terms with what he believes is a more realistic
trichotomy. The first category of the proposed trichotomy would include terms
which are the product of direct consent (expressed or implied in fact terms); the
second category would include terms produced by indirect consent (implied in
law default rules); and the third prong of the trichotomy would include terms
imposed totally irrespective of consent (implied in law immutable terms). Bar-
nett, supra note 58, at 827-28. Professor Barnett postulates that his proposed
reconfiguration, would reduce the instances in which terms are genuinely im-
posed on the parties. Id.
The foregoing formula is consistent with Professor Barnett's consent theory of
contract-enforceable and unenforceable contracts can be distinguished by deter-
mining if the parties to a particular agreement manifested an intention to create
or alter their legal relations-which he argues was the predominant theory of
contract in the nineteenth century. Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Con-
tract as Promise, 77 CORNE.LL L. REV. 1022, 1027-28 (1992).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
creasingly this process is referred to as the concept of default rules63
which also embodies the idea that contract terms will be supplied in
instances where parties fail otherwise to agree.64
The default rule approach analogizes the way that contract law fills gaps in
the expressed consent of contracting parties to the way that word-processing
programs set our margins for us in the absence of our expressly setting them
for ourselves. A word-processing program that required us to set every varia-
ble needed to write a page of text would be more trouble than it was worth.
Instead, all word-processing programs provide default settings for such vari-
ables as margins, type fonts, and line spacing and leave it to the user to change
any of these default settings to better suit his or her purposes. 6 5
Accordingly, a default rule will govern contractual relations unless
the parties elect to contract around them.66 The concept of default
rules or, under the more traditional parlance, of gap fillers, is gener-
ally recognized to be efficient "if it imposes a term that the parties to a
contract would have agreed to had they dealt with the matter in their
negotiations. This is so because, with such a default rule to rely upon,
the parties can be spared the transaction costs of reaching an agree-
ment on that term."67 In sum, despite different terminology a default
63. The default rule terminology is believed to have been transplanted from corpo-
rate legal theory to contract law. Barnett, supra note 58, at 824 n.13.
64. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contract" An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). Default rules are neces-
sary to fill gaps in incomplete contracts, the incompleteness occurring either
because (1) the contract failed to specify duties for particular future contingen-
cies; or (2) a contract is insensitive to a relevant future contingency. Id. at 92 n.29.
65. Barnett, supra note 58, at 824.
66. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 64, at 87. Professors Ayres and Gertner divide de-
fault rules into two distinct classes. The larger class is comprised of default rules
around which parties can contract such as the implied warranty of
merchantability. Id. at 87. The smaller class consists of "immutable" rules which
the parties cannot contract around such as the duty of good faith. Id. at 87.
Professor Barnett notes that the default rule approach to gap filling finds dis-
tinction in contract law in that default rules are binding in the absence of a con-
trary manifested assent. He agrees with the Ayres and Gertner categorization of
default rules and concludes that a gap-filling principle which parties cannot con-
tract around is not a default rule but an immutable rule--"that is, some other
kind of contract law background norm that may fill a gap in assent or may even
displace the manifested assent of the parties." Barnett, supra note 58, at 825.
67. Gregory S. Crespi, The Adequate Assurances Doctrine After U.CC. § 2-609. A Test
of the Efjw'iency of the Common Law, 12-13 38 VILL. L. REv. 179, 187 (1993)(citing
to Ayres & Gertner, supra and citations set forth therein in which commentators
discuss the efficiency of default rules).
As stated by Judge Posner:
In speaking of an implied contractual term we identify another im-
portant function of contract law.... The longer the performance will
take... the harder it will be for the parties to foresee the various contin-
gencies that might affect performance. Moreover, come contingencies,
although foreseeable in the sense that both parties well know that they
could occur, are so unlikely to occur that the costs of careful drafting to
deal with them might exceed the benefits, when those benefits are dis-
counted by the (low) probability that the contingency will actually occur.
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rule essentially fills gaps in incomplete contracts 68 and thus consti-
tutes an alternative means of stating the implied in law or gap filler
process.
Despite the alternative ways69 in which the concept can be ex-
pressed, the primary significance is that a gap-filling term or default
contract rule amounts to "an implicit term of a contract unless the
It may be cheaper for the court to 'draft' the contractual term necessary
to deal with the contingency if and when it occurs.
RICHARD POsNER, EcoNoiC ANALYSIS OF LAW 82 (3rd ed. 1986); see Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of
Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983)(default rules should com-
port with the terms parties would have reached were they to bargain over each
detail of a transaction).
68. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 64, at 91-93. An incomplete contract has been de-
scribed in economics terminology as "any contract short of the ideal of a complete
contingent contract, which has been drafted with all contingencies in mind and
provides for optimal performance on every contingency." Mark P. Gergen, The
Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUMt. L. REv. 997, 999 (1992).
Professor Farnsworth explained that disputes concerning omissions in con-
tracts arise when there is an absence or understatement of expectation. Farns-
worth, supra note 54, at 871. The former occurs when the parties fail to consider
the particular situation and, therefore, develop no expectation with respect to it.
Thus, they fail to foresee it. Id. The latter arises when the parties develop expec-
tations with respect to a particular situation but fail to reduce those expectations
to Writing. Id. at 872. The reasons for understatement range from the assump-
tion that a certain expectation accompanies what has been expressed, to fear that
attempts to reduce the expectation to writing will result in delay or hinder com-
pletion of the deal. Id.
The parties may fail to include a term because they did not foresee a
particular situation which later causes a dispute between them, or they
may have failed to manifest their intention with respect to a foreseeable
situation, or, they may have deliberately avoided manifesting any inten-
tion with respect to a foreseeable situation because it could have ham-
pered negotiations or simply because they considered the matter not
worth mentioning.
JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACT 438 (3d ed. 1990). See RE.
STATFMAN (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTS § 204, cmt. (b)(1979) noting reasons why
omissions occur.
Other scholars attribute contractual incompleteness primarily to the costs of
contracting. "Contracts may be incomplete because the transaction costs of ex-
plicitly contracting for a given contingency are greater than the benefits. These
transaction costs may include legal fees, negotiation costs, drafting and printing
costs, the costs of researching the effects and probability of a contingency, and the
costs to the parties and the courts of verifying whether a contingency occurred."
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 64, at 92-93; see Barnett, supra note 58, at 822 (not-
ing the costs of attempting to anticipate even those contingencies which are fore-
seeable influence parties not to negotiate such terms).
69. Alternative terminology has been used to convey the concept encompassed by gap
filler and default rule terminology. Examples of such terminology include "back-
ground, backstop, enabling, fallback, gap-filling, off-the-rack, opt-in, opt-out,
preformulated, preset, presumptive, standby, standard-form and suppletory
rules." Ayres & Gertner, supra note 64, at 91.
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contracting parties explicitly agree to vary it."70 Moreover these
terms embody the idea that implying a term aids in defining the exact
scope of parties' contractual obligations. Thus gap fillers or default
rules define "the exact substance of a party's obligation, by specifying
(among other things) the condition under which her nonperformance
will be excused, and the sanction which will be applied to any unex-
cused nonperformance." 71
As will be seen below, the implied warranty of workmanlike per-
formance is an implied term which operates as a gap filler.72 It thus
joins an impressive list of other gap filling terms which operate to im-
ply conditions into agreements such as: (1) the implied warranty of
merchantability in the sale of goods; (2) the rule that payments and
delivery of goods constitute concurrent conditions; (3) the implied
warranty that vessels are seaworthy; (4) the implied warranty of hab-
itability;7 3 and (5) obligation to complete performance within a reason-
able time.74
Early decisions in which courts implied a warranty of workmanlike
performance into agreements reveal the courts' perception of it as an
implied term which operated as a constructive condition amending or
supplementing the parties' expressed intent. Specifically, it deter-
mined the standard or manner of performance when the parties to
service contracts failed to specify otherwise.75 These cases also sup-
port the proposition that implication of a warranty of workmanlike
performance into these agreements is not dependent on the intentions
of the parties.76 Rather it functions as a suppletive rule of law based
on a "common factual situation or set of conditions," which are appli-
cable unless otherwise stated.77
70. Jason Scott Johnson, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 615-16 (1990); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 64,
at 87.
71. Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising,
88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 503 (1989). Professor Craswell has elected to refer to such
rules as "background rules" rather than default rules which he views as a more
limited concept since they apply only to those rules which the parties can agree to
vary by inserting appropriate language into their contract. He defines back-
ground rules to encompass contract rules which are both waivable and nonwaiv-
able. Id. at 489-90.
72. For a discussion of constructive conditions see note 87, infra.
73. Williams, supra note 54, at 403.
74. See Hadjiyannakis, supra note 54, at 40; see also, JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (3d ed. 1988) § 3-4 through 3-11 for dis-
cussion of gap filler terms adopted in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Article 2 includes gap fillers relating to price, delivery, quantity, and payment
terms.
75. The use of default rules to dictate the details and standard of performance has
been acknowledged. Goetz & Scott, supra note 62, at 270, 276.
76. See Farnsworth, supra note 55, at 864-66.
77. Id. at 866.
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II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE WARRANTY OF
WORKMANLIKE PERFORMANCE
A. Early Decisions
1. Gap Filler/Default Rule Formulation
Early decisions in which courts stated that the workmanlike per-
formance warranty arose as a matter of law7 s support the characteri-
zation of the warranty as a gap filler. Certain of these cases
emphasized that implication of the warranty was proper under cir-
cumstances where the contract failed to specify the level of perform-
ance required.79 This idea was expressed in Hattin v. Chase8 O as
78. Early American cases virtually uniformly held that the obligation to perform in a
workmanlike manner was implied by law. One illustrative case is Hartford Mill
Co. v. Hartford Tobacco Warehouse Co., 121 S.W. 477 (Ky. 1909), which involved a
contract to build an addition to a warehouse. Id. at 478. The court held that the
law implied the obligation that a contractor undertaking services perform in a
workmanlike manner. Id. at 479. Accord Manuel v. Campbell, 3 Ark. 324, 335,
337 (1841)(it is presumed that one who contracts to perform a service will do so in
a workmanlike manner); Doster v. Brown, 25 Ga. 24,27 (1858)(a party is required
as a matter of law to do faithful work); Manville v. McCoy, 3 Ind. 148 (1851);
Byerly v. Kepley, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 35 (N.C. 1853)(instruction that work was to be
performed in workmanlike manner was correct); Somerby v. Tappan, Wright 570,
572 (Ohio 1834)(law implies obligation on part of workman to perform in work-
manlike manner); Waul v. Hardie, 17 Tex. 553, 559 (1856)(trial court erred in not
instructing jury that work must be performed in a workmanlike manner); Davis
v. Baxter, 2 Patt. & H. 133, 698 (Va. 1856)(unfaithful service is defense to action
for services rendered). See note 79, infra for citations to additional decisions
adopting this principle.
In addition to the reasons previously given for why courts resort to implied in
law terminology, early courts may have used the implied in law language as a
means of connecting the implication of the workmanlike performance obligation
to parties' intent. This additional explanation is consistent with the approach ini-
tially taken by courts which began in the early 19th century to look to sources
beyond the terms of the agreement to determine rights and obligations. See
Farnsworth, supra note 54, at 863-64. The use of implied in law language was a
part of an effort by courts to preserve the illusion that implied terms were pre-
mised on the intent of parties. Id. at 863-864. As courts gradually became more
comfortable in looking beyond parties' expressed expectations, they more readily
incorporated into agreements terms premised on notions of fairness and justice
and not on the pretext of the parties' intention. Id. at 864-66. "Thus by 1893,
when Parliament enacted the Sale of Goods Act, the warranties of fitness and
merchantability were no longer stated as terms based on the 'intention' of the
parties, but as suppletive rules of law. The same formula was followed in the
Uniform Sales Act and in the Uniform Commercial Code...." Id. at 865.
79. Schindler v. Green, 82 P. 631, 632 (Cal. App. 1905)(where contract fails to provide,
law imposes obligation to perform in workmanlike manner); Bye v. George W.
McCaulley & Son Co., 76 A. 621, 622 (Del. 1908)(law presumes workman will per-
form services in a skillful and workmanlike manner); Hall v. Cannon, 4 Del. (4
Harr.) 360, 362 (Del. 1846)(one who undertakes to perform work requiring skill
also undertakes to perform in a workmanlike manner); Cannon v. Hunt, 42 S.E.
734, 734-36 (Ga. 1902) (where plans and specifications do not prescribe a particular
kind of material to be used for a given purpose and in a specified way, but, in
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follows:
The law, interpreting the contract, adds to its general words, in the absence of
special ones, or of special facts controlling the particular case, his promise to
bring to the work ordinary skill and capacity, together with integrity therein
and faithfulness to the interests of his employer.8 1
Similarly, in Lane v. Pacific & L N. Ry.82 the idea of the warranty
of workmanlike performance operating as a gap filler necessary to de-
fine performance standards where the agreements fails to specify the
manner of performance was presented as follows: "It is a well-estab-
lished rule that where a party agrees to do a certain thing, and does
not specify how it shall be done, the law implied a promise on his part
to do it in the usual manner.... "83
In another group of cases the notion of the warranty of workman-
like performance operating as gap filler which defined performance
obligations was stated in terms of the impact the failure to comply
with the obligation would have on the parties' respective contractual
duties.8 4 Thus in one case, the court held that when the failure to
perform in a workmanlike manner renders the work of no value to
the service recipient, the latter's obligation to pay for services is dis-
charged.8 5 The court also concluded that improper performance enti-
general terms, impose upon the contractor the obligation of bringing about a
given result, he is under the duty to produce a workmanlike job); Springdale
Cemetery Ass'n v. Smith, 32 Ill. 252, 260 (1863)(law implies that labor should be
provided in a skillful manner, absent an agreement to the contrary); Smith &
Nelson v. Bristol, 33 Iowa 24, 25 (1871) (where contract fails to specify, law implies
that contractor is obligated to perform in workmanlike manner); Hartford Mill
Co. v. Hartford Tobacco Warehouse Co., 121 S.W. 477, 479 (Ky. 1909)(where con-
tract is silent, law implies obligation to construct building using skillful work-
manship); Mayer Ice Mach. & Eng'g Co. v. VanVoorhis, 95 A. 735, 736 (N.J.
1915)(agreement is implied that work be performed in proper and workmanlike
manner); Muth v. Frost, 32 N.W. 231, 232 (Wis. 1887). See Gottschalk Constr. Co.
v. Carlson, 252 Ill. App. 520, 529 (1929)(contractor obligated to install sidewalk
system in workmanlike manner); Taussig v. Wind, 71 S.W. 1095, 1097-98 (Mo.
App. 1903)(obligation to perform in workmanlike manner is imposed on service
providers).
80. 33 A. 989 (Me. 1895)
81. Id. at 989-990 (emphasis added).
82. 67 P. 656 (Idaho 1902).
83. Id. at 658. As noted above, the language in Lane referencing the expectations of
the parties may reflect the predilection of courts to try to connect the implication
of terms to the parties' intentions. See Farnsworth, supra note 54, at 863-64 (em-
phasis added).
84. E.g., Muth v. Frost, 32 N.W. 231 (Wis. 1887).
85. Waul v. Hardie, 17 Tex. 553, 557-58 (1856). In Waul, plaintiff sought to recover for
damages for work performed in the erection of a mill. Id. at 554. Defendant re-
sponded by asserting plaintiff's unworkmanlike performance as a defense. In re-
versing the lower court's refusal to instruct the jury that the law implies a duty to
perform in a workmanlike manner, the appellate court noted the trial court's
error in failing to instruct the jury on the uncontrovertible law concerning the
effects of the failure to perform in a workmanlike manner. Id. at 558-59. The
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tled the service recipient to recover for damage resulting therefrom.8 6
Under such a scenario, the failure to fulfill the condition of proper
workmanship could not only discharge the service recipient's perform-
ance obligation, but could also give rise to a cause of action for dam-
ages. This treatment of the warranty of workmanlike performance as
a constructive condition 7 demonstrates the perception of it as a gap
uncontrovertible law to which the court referred was the rule that the law im-
plies an obligation to perform work in workmanlike manner. Id. The effects of
the implication of this obligation included the discharge of defendant's obligation
to pay for the work and the potential liability of plaintiff for damages resulting
from the improperly performed work. Id. at 557-58.
86. Id; accord, Manuel v. Campbell, 3 Ark. 324,337 (1841)(workmanlike performance
is condition precedent to obligation to compensate contractor for services ren-
dered); Bye v. George W. McCaulley & Son Co., 76 A. 621, 623 (Del. 1908)(service
recipient may be entitled to set-off or total release from payment obligation for
contractor's defective work); Hall v. Cannon, 4 Del. (4 Han.) 360,363 (1846)(work-
man's failure to perform in workmanlike manner may preclude his recovery on
contract); Manville v. McCoy, 3 Ind. 148, 150 (1851)(service recipient may deduct
from amount due to service provider for damages resulting from latter's failure to
perform in a workmanlike manner); Smith v. Bristol, 33 Iowa 24, 25
(1871)(carpenters cannot recover contract price for services performed in un-
workmanlike manner); Taft v. Inhabitants of Montague, 14 Mass. 282
(1817)(breach of express promise to perform in workmanlike manner entitles
service recipient to claim for damages); Schuler v. Eckert, 51 N.W. 198, 199-200
(Mich. 1892)(contractor's recovery under contract can be reduced by amount re-
flecting damages resulting from improper performance); Sherman v. Bates, 16
N.W. 831 (Neb. 1883)(improper performance supports claim for damages); Dyer v.
Lintz, 68 A. 908 (N.J. 1908)(unworkmanlike performance by contractor allows
owner an allowance against amounts due contractor); Davis v. Baxter, 2 Pat. & H.
133, 138-39 (Va. 1856)(failure to perform in workmanlike manner may entitle ser-
vice recipient to offset against amounts claimed by contractor for services ren-
dered); Muth v. Frost, 32 N.W. 231, 232 (Wis. 1887)(extent to which work is
performed in workmanlike manner determines the extent to which a service pro-
vider can recover the contract price and its liability for damages resulting from
improper performance).
87. A constructive condition also falls under the rubric of gap filler or implied in law
terms as pointed out by Professor Corbin.
[A certain fact] may operate as a condition because the court believes
that the parties would have intended it to operate as such if they had
thought about it at all, or because the court believes that by reason of the
mores of the time justice requires that it should so operate. It may then
be described as a condition implied by law, or better as a constructive
condition.
Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 744
(1919)(footnote omitted); Hadjiyannakis, supra note 54, at 39, n.25; Farnsworth,
supra note 54, at 866 ("The term read into the contract was labelled a 'construc-
tive' rather than an 'implied' condition to indicate that it was rooted in 'a rule of
law, and is not based on interpretation' ").
Commenting on the consequences of a condition, Professor Patterson
remarked
[s]ince a contract may be conditioned in a way which does not depend
upon its containing conditional language, the word "condition," in this
broader sense, is not synonymous with a term in a contract; a condition is
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filler provision defining the parties' performance obligations.
2. Failure of Consideration
Other cases spoke of implying a duty of workmanlike performance
as necessary to avoid a "failure of consideration."88 Failure of consid-
eration is confusing terminology which has largely fallen out of us-
age.8 9  Notwithstanding what the concept suggests, it relates to
afact which bears a certain relation to the obligation of a contract (foot-
note omitted). Condition, then, denotes facts (events or occurrences)
and connotes legal consequences. The primary legal consequence of a
condition in a contract is that it gives the promisor a defense (negative or
affirmative) to an action for the breach of his promise. His duty to per-
form his promise is dependent upon the condition, which may be, of
course, the occurrence of a specified event or type of event, or its non-
occurrence.
Edwin W. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REV.
903-904 (1942). Professor Wiliams viewed implied terms which he preferred to
designate as constructive conditions as legislation which amends or supplements
expressed intent. Such terms are incorporated in the absence of an express or
contrary intention. Williams, supra note 54, at 404.
Professors Goetz and Scott also recognize that many gap-filler terms or de-
fault rules operate to create constructive conditions. Goetz & Scott, supra note
62, at 270-71.
Indeed, a key purpose of state-supplied terms is to save the parties from
the necessity of formulating a complete set of express conditions for con-
tingencies that may be difficult to anticipate, or are at least easily over-
looked. Thus, many of the general rules of contract, such as those of
impossibility and excuse, impose constructive conditions that reduce in-
completeness risks. These supplementary rules of contract do not re-
move all incompleteness, however; they are necessarily generalized
formulations that do not purport to address every set of circumstances.
Id.
Under a constructive condition analysis, the implied warranty of workmanlike
performance would perform a dual function. On the one hand, it operates to pre-
vent an immediate duty (typically the obligation of a service-recipient to pay)
from becoming due. It thus can operate to discharge the service recipient's per-
formance obligation. In addition, it creates a secondary duty in a service provider
to compensate the service recipient for the former's failure to perform in a work-
manlike manner. See Corbin, supra, at 742, 745. Thus, it would create a new
right, that being the right of the service recipient to seek damages for breach of
the promise to perform properly.
88. See Wade v. Haycock, 25 Pa. 382, 383 (1855)(defendant asserted plaintiff not enti-
tled to recover for services since failure to perform in a workmanlike manner
resulted in a failure of consideration).
89. MURRAY, supra note 68, at 602 (use of the anomalous phrase "failure of considera-
tion" as grounds for discharging another party's performance obligations resulted
in some confusion since the term consideration is normally used in the context of
contract formation); 3A ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 658, pp. 155-
577 (1960)(also noting that when courts speak confusingly of "failure of consider-
ation" what they mean is failure of performance).
To avoid the confusion generated by this terminology, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts rejects the phrase, "failure of consideration" and replaces it
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performance obligations and not to contract formation.9 0 The phrase
merely provides an alternative means of expressing the principle that
one party's failure to deliver the performance promised may poten-
tially result in discharge of the other party's performance obligation.
Thus failure of consideration is "another way of stating that the prom-
isor's performance is dependent and conditional on the delivery or
tender of what the promisee has promised."' 91
Consequently, when courts spoke (or in instances when they con-
tinue to speak)92 of failure of consideration in the context of a breach
of the implied warranty of workmanlike performance, satisfactory
performance-rendering services in a workmanlike manner-became
a condition precedent to the service recipient's obligation to pay for
the services rendered. When failure of consideration is replaced with
modern parlance, improper performance provides the basis for finding
nonperformance which may, in a proper case, not only discharge the
services recipient of its payment obligation, but also subject the service
provider to a claim for breach of contract. In short, this form of analy-
sis further suggests that the warranty of workmanlike performance
was regarded as a gap filler which operated to define performance
obligations.
with "failure of performance." MURRAY, supra note 68, at § 108, p. 602; FARNs-
WORTH, supra note 8, at 607.
90. CoRIN, supra note 89, at § 658 p. 155 (noting the term failure of consideration is
not synonymous with an absence of consideration which relates to the contract
formation process); Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist. v. Coulson, 692 S.W.2d 897, 903,
n.2 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)(" 'failure of consideration' has nothing to do with an ab-
sence of consideration; the less confusing term used in the Restatement is 'failure
of performance' "); Kent Feeds, Inc. v. Stahl, 238 N.W.2d 483, 487 (S.D.
1976)(Lack and failure of consideration are distinct concepts. One goes to the
reason for the alleged contract while the other focuses on events occurring after
contract formation).
91. CoRBn, supra note 89, at 156. Professor Patterson concluded that the substantive
effect of constructive conditions and the "failure of consideration" concept is the
same. Patterson, supra note 87, at 922. The only difference between the concepts
were procedural and pleading formalities. Id.
92. For illustrative modern cases employing failure of consideration terminology see
Worcester Heritage Soc'y, Inc. v. Trussell, 577 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991)("The right to rescind a contract on the ground of failure of consideration
exists only where the failure of consideration amounts to an abrogation of the
contract, or goes to the essence of it, or takes away its foundation")(quoting
DeAngelis v. Palladino, 61 N.E.2d 117 (Mass. 1945)); Colonial Ins. Co. v. Graw, 129
N.E.2d 491, 495-96 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955)(failure of consideration occurs when one
of the parties to the contract refuses or neglects to perform the consideration
agreed upon); Burt, Vetterlein & Bushnell, P.C. v. Stein, 844 P.2d 239, 244 (Or. Ct.
App. 1992)(failure of consideration excuses a party's nonperformance where evi-
dence demonstrates that the other party materially failed to do what the contract
required); Kent Feeds, Inc. v. Stahl, 238 N.W.2d 483, 487 (S.D. 1976)(a partial fail-
ure of considerations creates a basis for abatement of damages).
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3. Hypothetical Intention or Justice?
Thus we see that the implied warranty of workmanlike perform-
ance, as originally conceived by American courts, served as a gap filler
or default rule which applied unless the parties expressed a contrary
intention. Although the warranty's conceptualization as a gap filler
can be readily established, uncertainty appears in advancing to the
next level of analysis; is the concept's status as an implied in law term
(gap filler/default rule) premised on the hypothetical intention of the
parties or on principles of fairness and justice? As previously dis-
cussed, implied in law terms were traditionally viewed as consisting
both of terms based on contracting parties' hypothetical intentions and
terms which courts implied based on principles of fairness and
justice.93
To the extent that the warranty of workmanlike performance is a
gap filler 94 which furthers the common sense,95 yet unexpressed, ex-
pectations of the parties, perhaps it is premised on what the parties
93. Refer to discussion accompanying notes 58-62, supra.
But see Farnsworth supra note 54, at 879-80, attacking the soundness of the
first of these premises. He argued that inference premised on the hypothetical
intentions of the parties is contrived due to the speculation in which courts must
engage in attempting to ascertain whether the parties would have sought to in-
clude a term even if they had foreseen a situation and if so, what term they would
have supplied if they had expressed their expectation in writing.
Professors Ayres and Gertner have relied on economic analysis to attack the
premise of implication that courts should fill in the gap with the terms the parties
"would have wanted." They recognize that most theorists conclude that courts
should fill gaps with terms which the parties could have wanted. This is a conse-
quence of the theory that parties have gaps in agreements because of transaction
costs. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 64, at 93. They argue, however, that the
transaction costs theory overlooks the possibility that parties allow gaps to exist
(that is withhold information) for strategic reasons. Therefore, lawmakers
should establish default rules that "encourage the better informed parties to re-
veal their information by contracting around the default." Id. at 127.
94. Assuming as this discussion does that the warranty of workmanlike performance
is a gap filler or default rule which has the operative effect of a constructive con-
dition, the question arises whether it should be immutable. Incorporating into
service agreements the duty to perform in a workmanlike manner may reflect a
normal expectation that those who enter into service contracts expect, at a mini-
mum, proper performance. See Barnett, supra note 58, at 884. The implied war-
ranty of workmanlike performance in functioning as a background rule
establishes just such a presumption. If it reflects an expectation which goes to
the very essence of particular transactions, arguably it takes on the character of
implied terms such as the duty of good faith. Indeed, a case can be made that it is
untenable to believe that a service recipient would enter into an agreement
where it would condone improper services. See Barnett, supra note 58.
Although beyond the scope of this article, this inquiry leads to a question of
whether the implied warranty of workmanlike performance is a term that can be
displaced only with a more stringent and specific standard of care than that
which it imposes. Under such a formulation, the warranty sets a minimum stan-
dard of performance which cannot be derogated and can only be enhanced. The
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would have agreed to if they had given the matter thought. On the
other hand, to the extent that the warranty is the result of some opin-
ion as to policy, or some attitude not capable of exact qualitative mea-
surement 6 and a resulting allocation of risk, it may be viewed as
premised on principles of fairness and justice.97
In general, just as the dividing line between implied in fact and
implied in law is unclear,98 the line between the premises for court
over-arching question becomes to what extent service providers should be per-
mitted to allocate risk of improper performance to the service recipients.
95. Professor Barnett has constructed the following definition: "'[C]ommon sense,'
as used here, simply means the sense of things that most people share in com-
mon." Barnett, supra note 58, at 880.
96. Farnsworth, supra note 54, at 879.
The sources of these principles of fairness and justice have been described as
follows:
Where do courts find these basic principles of justice? Often they look to
the idea of fairness in the exchange. In searching for what Lord Mans-
field called "the essence of the agreement," a court seeks a fair bargain.
It may, for example, justify the term it supplies on the ground that the
term prevents one party from being in a position of "economic servility"
and "completely at the mercy" of the other. It is likely to supply a term
that is suitable for a particular market or other segment of society or
even for society in general. Furthermore, if the situation is a recurring
one, a court will try to resolve the omitted case in a way that yields a
convenient rule or that promotes certainty.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at § 7.16, at 548 (footnotes omitted).
97. In discussing the manner in which a principle based upon justice or fairness may
be chosen, it has been stated:
A result may be chosen on the basis of a convenient rule of thumb or
because it will discourage litigation by promoting certainty... Or a re-
sult may be chosen because it places the risk in a way that is thought
desirable from the point of view of a particular market or of society in
general. (citations omitted).
Farnsworth, supra note 54, at 878-79.
98. See discussion accompanying note 57, supra.
Professor Treitel in discussing The Moorcock, which is routinely cited as the
leading authority on the concept of implied in fact terms, TREITEL, supra note 8,
at 164, illustrates that English courts and scholars also struggle with distinguish-
ing between implied in fact and implied in law terms. In The Moorcock, plaintiffs
contracted to unload their ship at a wharf owned by defendants. Id. The ship
incurred damage when it settled at low tide on a ridge of hard ground. Id. The
court found defendants liable for the resulting damages based on breach of an
implied term to exercise reasonable care to see that the ship's berth was safe. Id.
Professor Treitel posits that careful analysis of the opinion, demonstrates that
the court's implication of the term was premised both on implied in fact and im-
plied in law principles.
Lord Esher M.R. said that it must be implied that the defendants had
'undertaken to see that the bottom of the river is reasonably fit, or at all
events that they have taken reasonable care to find out that the bottom
of the river is reasonably fit for the purpose.... Had these alternatives
been put to the parties they might well have disagreed. (emphasis ad-
ded). This suggests that the term was not implied in fact but in law.
Again in a famous passage, Bowen L.J. said: 'An implied warranty, or, as
it is called, a covenant in law ... is in all cases founded on the presumed
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supplied terms is also unclear. "In practice, expectation shades into
fairness or justice so that it is often hard to distinguish between the
two." 99 No doubt, principles of fairness reflect the expectations which
arise from particular relationships. At the same time, common sense
expectations justify imposing obligations which reflect the expecta-
tions of the business community or context within which parties
operate.
Regardless of the precise theoretical basis, the warranty of work-
manlike performance is a court supplied gap filler which governs un-
less the parties express a contrary intention. 0 0 In summary, the
warranty of workmanlike performance has been selected as a gap fil-
ler because it comports with the way in which service providers and
recipients transact business and with the expectations reasonably
flowing from this relationship. Consequently, the implication of this
term makes common sense in the context of these transactions and
presumably promotes fairness and justice. Therefore, the implied
warranty of workmanlike performance can be viewed as a generalized
standard which helps to create a bridge which links expectation (ac-
tual or hypothetical) with notions of justice and fairness.' 0 '
This relationship between expectation and justice appears in Eng-
lish cases which, like their American counterparts, recognize that the
obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner is based on premises
which operate independently of the actual intentions of parties. 02
intention of the parties and upon reason.... In business transactions
such as this, what the law desires to effect by the implication is to give
such business efficacy to the transaction as must have been intended at
all events by both parties who are businessmen. The italicized phrases
show that Bowen L.J. was not exclusively concerned with the intention
of the parties.
Id. From the foregoing, Professor Treitel extrapolates that in many instances a
court's implication of terms is premised neither upon implied in law nor implied
in fact but on both.
99. Farnsworth, supra note 54, at 877.
100. See Corbin, supra note 56, at 278-79 (suggesting that the precise bases on which a
term is implied are often irrelevant).
101. See Farnsworth, supra note 54, at 878.
102. See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 162 (implied in law terms differ from implied in fact
terms in that the former do not depend on any inference as to parties' actual
intentions).
In Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates Ltd., 2 K.B. 113 (1931), the court noted that
where a builder has an obligation to erect a house, the law will further imply a
promise that the house is to be constructed in an efficient and workmanlike man-
ner. "[Q]uite apart from the express agreement ... [was] an implied agreement
that this house should be completed in an efficient and workmanlike manner....
Id. at 122.
In the seminal case of Duncan v. Blundell, 171 Eng. Rep. 749 (1820) the court
suggests the source of the warranty of workmanlike performance exists in-
dependent of the actual intentions of the parties. The Duncan court spoke of the
duty created in broad terms, suggesting the implied obligation to perform in a
1993] WARRANTY OF WORKMANLIKE PERFORMANCE 1007
Thus in England it has been said that the law implies terms not to
make a contract more reasonable in its consequences but only in order
to give the contract "business efficacy."103 In addition, the workman-
like performance obligation has been imputed into contracts because
in the context of service contracts, justice and fairness required its im-
plication.104 In short, like American courts, English courts viewed the
workmanlike performance obligation as serving a gap filling function
workmanlike manner arose as a matter of justice and fairness based upon the
nature of the relationship and tacit assumptions arising therefrom as providing
predicates for the obligation.
See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMNTwARIES 165, where it is said that the implied war-
ranty of workmanlike performance was such a term that "reason and justice dic-
tate, and which therefore the law presumes that every man has contracted to
perform [a service], and upon this presumption makes him answerable to such
persons as suffer by his non-performance."
That the duty to perform in a workmanlike manner is premised on notions of
fairness and justice was articulated in dictum in Lucas v. Godwin, 132 Eng. Rep.
595 (1837) where plaintiff contractor agreed to build six cottages. The contract
provided, in part, that plaintiff would construct the cottage by a certain date and
would execute the work in a workmanlike manner. Plaintiff failed to complete
construction of the house before the date stipulated in the contract. In ruling on
behalf of the plaintiff's right to recover, the court noted that notwithstanding
express contractual language that the work be performed in a proper and work-
manlike manner, such a condition was implied into every contract of the type
before it-the provision of building services. This focus on the nature of the rela-
tionship as justifying the imposition of the obligation connotes principles of jus-
tice and fairness.
Another interesting aspect of Lucas is the effect of the contractor's improper
performance. The court afforded failure to comply with the warranty the same
operative effect an American court would have given applying a constructive con-
dition analysis. It concluded that when an implied in the workmanlike perform-
ance obligation is not satisfied, breach may have occurred. Id. at 743-44. In
addition, the court held compliance with the condition was a condition precedent
to recovery. Id.
Similar expressions can be found in Basten v. Butter, 103 Eng. Rep. 185 (1806).
There Le Blanc J., stated "the plaintiff must be prepared to shew [sic] that his
work was properly done, . . . otherwise he has not performed that which he has
undertook to do, and the consideration fails." Id. at 188. It was further stated by
Lawrence J. that "if the work stipulated for at a certain price was not properly
executed, the plaintiff would not have done that which he engaged to do; the
doing which would be the consideration of the defendant's promise to pay ......
Id. at 187.
103. ALFRED ARTHUR HUDSON, BUILDING AND ENGINEERING CONTRACTS, 50, (10th ed.
1970). The author states that one of the more important of the terms implied,
when the agreement fails otherwise to specify, is that workmanship shall be of a
proper standard. Id. at 50-51. In the context of construction contracts, other
terms which the law will apply in the absence of express provision include an
implied obligation to complete performance within a reasonable time, and an im-
plied obligation to perform work with reasonable diligence and due expedition.
Id. at 51-52.
104. In England, the concept of implied in law terms has been described as duties aris-
ing prima facie out of certain contractual relationships or as legal incidents to
such relationships. TRErrEL, supra note 8, at 162.
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which operated to more sharply define contractual performance obli-
gations.1 05 And as with American courts, the hypothetical inten-
tions106 of the parties and principles of fairness and justice coalesce to
provide the theoretical source for the obligation.
B. Summary
Early cases demonstrate that the concept of an implied in law term
provided the predominant theoretical premise for the implied war-
ranty of workmanlike performance. Courts implied the obligation
based on what they believed the parties would have contracted for and
upon a desire to achieve fairness-that is, what is necessary to further
common sense expectations which arise in service contracts. The
omitted case involving the implied warranty of workmanlike perform-
ance is analogous to the type of omitted case identified by one com-
mentator who stated that "[a]t one end are those instances where a
party is so confident that his expectation follows from what has been
said that it does not seem worthwhile to reduce it to contract lan-
guage." 107
Thus warranty of "workmanlike performance emanates from the
very fact that a builder or other service provider agreed to provide
services in exchange for consideration normally payment for such
services." 08 Therefore incorporating the warranty of workmanlike
performance is necessary to lend meaning and content to the parties'
respective contractual undertakings where they have failed to do so.
It defines the performance obligations of service providers. In addi-
tion, the respective rights and duties of service providers and service
recipients depend on the fulfillment of a condition to perform in a
workmanlike manner. Consequently, improper performance might
operate to discharge the service recipient's obligation to pay and con-
versely defeat the contractor's right to payment for services ren-
dered.10 9  In appropriate cases, the workmanlike performance
105. The gap filling function of the implied duty to perform in a workmanlike manner
is acknowledged by the author of a leading English treatise on building contracts.
He concludes that "[iln the absence of any special term or direction in the con-
tract specifying the manner in which the work is to be done, there is an implied
condition in all contracts for work and labour that the work will be carried out
with care and skill, or as it is sometimes expressed, in a good and workmanlike
manner." HUDSON, supra noe 103, at 305. The author concludes that the obliga-
tion amounts to nothing more than a warranty that the work described in the
contract will be carried out with reasonable skill and care. Id.
106. In Pearce v. Tucker, the court's statement that "it is doubtful that the parties
would have contracted if they had known the work would not have been per-
formed properly," suggests that the implied obligation arises from the hypotheti-
cal intentions of the parties.
107. Farnsworth, supra note 54, at 872.
108. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 62, at 270.
109. The effect of this implication, as is the case for constructive conditions generally,
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obligation operates to create the right in service recipient to seek
breach of contract damages from the service provider. Therefore, the
implied warranty of workmanlike performance was perceived as oper-
ating such that it could, on the one hand, prevent an immediate duty
(typically the obligation to pay for services rendered) from being
imposed on the service recipient, and, on the other hand, subject the
service provider to damages for the failure to comply with the per-
formance standard.110
The forgoing discussion underscores the contractual nature of the
obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner, at least, as it was tra-
ditionally perceived. Yet as the following discussion reveals, modern
courts are not uniform in recognizing a contractual conceptualization
of the warranty of workmanlike performance.
IV. MODERN RECOGNITION AND DIVERGENT
FORMLATIONS
A. Transformation and Expansion
Like their predecessors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, modern American courts have uniformly embraced the con-
cept that contractors and other service providers impliedly warrant to
perform in a workmanlike manner.11 1 One consequence of the wide-
is to render a contractual duty contingent. MURRAY, supra note 68, at 558. Or as
stated by another commentator, "[t]he primary legal consequence of a condition
in a contract is that it gives the promisor a defense (negative or affirmative) to an
action for the breach of his promise. His duty to perform his promise is depen-
dent upon the condition, which may be, of course, the occurrence of a specified
event or type of event, or its non-occurrence." Patterson, supra note 87, at 903-04.
110. Corbin, supra note 87, at 742, 745.
111. Economy Fuse & Mfg. Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 111 F.2d 875, 878-79 (7th
Cir. 1940) (applying Illinois law to find a contractor impliedly agrees to perform in
workmanlike manner); National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Westgate Constr.
Co., 227 F. Supp. 835, 837 (D. Del. 1964) (inherent in every construction contract is
implied duty to execute work in workmanlike manner); Watts Home, Inc. v.
Alonzo, 452 So.2d 1331,1332-333 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984)(service providers impliedily
agrees to perform with degree of workmanship possessed by those skilled in the
particular trade for which one is employed); J.R. Lewis v. Anchorage Asphalt
Paving Co., 535 P.2d 1188, 1195-196 (Alaska 1975)(contractor impliedly warrants
to perform in a workmanlike manner, and to produce structure fit for its in-
tended use); Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Anchorage v. Superior Burner Serv. Co.,
427 P.2d 833, 840 (Alaska 1967) (service provider impliedly warrants to perform in
workmanlike manner); Kubby v. Crescent Steel, 466 P.2d 753, 754 (Ariz.
1970)(contractor impliedly warrants to perform services in workmanlike manner
notwithstanding absence of express term to that effect); Reliable Elec. Co. v.
Clinton Campbell Contractor, Inc., 459 P.2d 98, 101 (Ariz. App. 1969)(law imposes
obligation on contractor to perform in a good and workmanlike manner); Coburn
v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 441 A.2d 620, 626 (Conn. 1982)(builder possesses duty to
exercise care); Cacace v. Morcaldi, 435 A.2d 1035, 1039 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1981)(covenant to perform in workmanlike manner is implied into contracts);
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spread acceptance of the doctrine is judicial divisiveness over its pre-
Premco Drilling, Inc. v. Maillet Bros. Builders, Inc., 218 A.2d 542, 544 (Conn. Cir.
Ct. 1965)(contractor has duty to perform in a workmanlike manner); Smith v.
Berwin Builders, Inc., 287 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972)(implied warranty
of good quality and workmanship is imposed on builders); Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm
Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1200 (D.C. 1984); Schmeck v. Sea Oats Condominium
Ass'n., Inc., 441 So.2d 1092, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(developer can be held
liable for failure to construct in workmanlike manner); Blue v. R.L. Glosson Con-
tracting, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 582, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)(every construction contract
implies a duty to perform services in skilful, diligent and workmanlike manner);
(Sam Finley, Inc. v. Barnes, 275 S.E.2d 380, 382 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)(a duty is im-
plied into every construction contract that contractor perform in skillful, careful
and workmanlike manner); Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ill.
1981)(since contract to construct a building involves the rendering of services,
there is an implied undertaking to perform services in a workmanlike manner);
Midwest Dredging Co. v. McAninch Corp., 424 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1988)(war-
ranty to perform in workmanlike manner is implied into construction contracts);
Markman v. Hoefer, 106 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Iowa 1960)(in the absence of express
term, obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner is implied into construc-
tion contracts); Corral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 732 P.2d 1260, 1268 (Kan.
1987)(one who agrees to perform work or render a service impliedly warrants to
perform in a workmanlike manner); Gilley v. Farmer, 485 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Kan.
1971)(law implies into contracts for rendering of services, duty that undertaking
be performed in workmanlike manner); Salard v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 563 So.
2d 1327, 1330 (La. Ct. App. 1990)(it is implied into every building contract, that
builder is to perform in workmanlike manner); Trahan v. Broussard, 399 So. 2d
782, 784 (La. Ct. App. 1981)(implicit in every contract is duty of builder to per-
form in a workmanlike manner); Previews v. Everets, 94 N.E.2d 267, 268 (Mass.
1950)(plaintiff who agreed to provide promotional services implied promised to
perform them in workmanlike and adequate manner); Friese v. Boston Consol.
Gas Co., 88 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. 1949)(gas company owed duty to install gas water
heater in workmanlike manner); Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 10 N.E.2d
82, 83 (Mass. 1937)(like other service providers, an insurer impliedly agrees to
perform a workmanlike job and to use reasonable care); Worthington Constr.
Corp. v. Moore, 291 A.2d 466, 467 (Md. 1972)(one who constructs a house is obli-
gated to use ordinary skill and care); Gaybis v. Palm, 93 A.2d 269, 272 (Md.
1952) (law implies obligation on part of contractor to perform work with skill and
care); Paine v. Spottiswoode, 612 A.2d 235, 238-39 (Me. 1992)(acknowledging con-
tractor's duty to build in workmanlike manner); Wimmer v. Down E. Properties,
Inc., 406 A.2d 88, 92 (Me. 1979)(law implies into construction contracts warranty
that work will be performed in a skillful and workmanlike manner); Gosselin v.
Better Homes, Inc., 256 A.2d 629, 639-40 (Me. 1969)(notwithstanding absence of
express term, an obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner is implied into
construction contracts); Dierickx v. Vulcan Industries, 158 N.W.2d 778, 783 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1968)(law imposes duty to perform services in workmanlike manner);
George B. Gilmore Co. v. Garrett, 582 So. 2d 387, 391 (Miss. 1991)(builder has a
duty to construct house in workmanlike manner); Ferguson v. Town Pump., Inc.,
580 P.2d 915, 920 (Mont. 1978)(a construction contract implies that a contractor
will perform work in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike manner); Garden
City Floral Co. v. Hunt, 255 P.2d 352, 355 (Mont. 1953)(accompanying every con-
tract is a common law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expediency and
faithfulness)(overruled in part on other grounds Bohrer v. Clark, 590 P.2d 117
(Mont. 1978)); Pioneer Enters., Inc. v. Edens, 216 Neb. 672, 675, 345 N.W.2d 16, 18
(1984) (every contract for services includes implied duty to perform skillfully and
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cise doctrinal meaning. This divergence of views is reflected in
varying perceptions of the dimensions of the warranty. Thus, in cer-
tain instances the obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner has
been construed to mean something more or different than a gap filler
or default rule which merely defines the standard by which a service
provider's performance is measured absent express agreement.
The following discussion will focus on the manner in which the
judiciary has approached two issues, as a vehicle for illustrating the
uncertainty surrounding application of the workmanlike performance
concept and the disparate views concerning its dimensions. Attention
is directed first to how misinterpretation of the theoretical premises of
the workmanlike performance warranty has sometimes led to its im-
proper absorption into the warranty of habitability2 Once again this
article posits that it is a misunderstanding of the fundamental bases of
the warranty which can account for such results. The discussion next
turns to an exploration of cases examining the substantive causes of
action which are invoked for failure to perform in a workmanlike
manner.113 A review of these cases reveals inconsistent results con-
spicuous for reasoning which ignores pertinent policy considera-
in workmanlike manner); Henggeler v. Jindra, 191 Neb. 317, 319, 214 N.W.2d 925,
926 (1974)(a contractor impliedly agrees to construct a building in a workmanlike
manner); Daniel v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 642 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Nev. 1982)(surveyor
possessed an implied duty to perform survey work in workmanlike manner);
Aronsohn v. Mandara, 484 A.2d 675, 678 (N.J. 1984)(in absence of express provi-
sion, law incorporates into contract an obligation to perform construction in a
reasonably good and workmanlike manner); Mascarenas v. Jaramillo, 806 P.2d 59,
61 (N.M. 1991)(tradesmen impliedly warrants to perform in a workmanlike man-
ner); Hartley v. Bailou, 209 S.E.2d 776,782 (N.C. 1974)(builder is obligated to per-
form in workmanlike manner); Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc., 433
N.E.2d 147, 149-50 (Ohio 1982)(implied warranty to perform in workmanlike
manner arises as a matter of law); Keel v. Titan Constr. Corp., 639 P.2d 1228, 1231
(Okla. 1981)(provider of services impliedly warrants to perform in workmanlike
manner); Cox v. Curnutt, 271 P.2d 342, 344 (Okla. 1954)(general contractor im-
pliedly warrants to perform in workmanlike manner); Lucas v. Canadian Valley
Area Vocational Technical Sch. 824 P.2d 1140, 1141 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992)(builder-
vendor of new home, impliedly warrants that home is constructed in workman-
like manner and is fit for intended use). Davis v. New England Pest Control Co.,
576 A.2d 1240, 1242 (R.I. 1990)(service contracts carry implied duty to perform
work in skillful, careful, diligent and workmanlike manner); Hill v. Polar Pan-
tries, 64 S.E.2d 885, 888 (S.C. 1951); Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber and Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 384 S.E.2d 730,736 (S.C. 1989)(builder impliedly warrants to erect building in
good careful, diligent and workmanlike manner); See Kirby Farms Homeowners
Ass'n v. Citicorp Citibank, N.A., 773 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)(impliedly
recognizing warranty of good and workmanlike performance attaches to the a
dwelling); (Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 731 (Wyom. 1979)(contractor is under
an implied obligation to perform his contractual obligations in a workmanlike
manner).
112. See text accompanying notes 121-147, infra.
113. See text accompanying notes 153-215, infra.
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tions.114 Moreover, it is in these cases where the transformation and
expansion of the warranty of workmanlike performance from a con-
tractually based gap filler into a hybrid tort is most pronounced.
The following discussion attempts to demonstrate that these incon-
sistent judicial determinations stem, at least in part, from a misunder-
standing of the theoretical underpinnings of the warranty of
workmanlike performance. It proposes that conceptualizing the war-
ranty as a gap filler or default rule provision will, at a minimum, en-
hance our understanding of the underlying nature of the obligation.
Further, a gap filler conceptualization will provide, at a minimum, a
framework of analysis which examines policy considerations typically
overlooked in resolving the myriad of issues implicated when the war-
ranty of workmanlike performance is at issue. Finally, the proposed
conceptualization may lessen reliance for resolving disputed issues on
concepts which possess their own conceptual and practical uncertain-
ties such as the economic loss rule.115
Before discussing these issues in detail, however, it is appropriate
to briefly reconsider a fundamental question often posed regarding the
warranty of workmanlike performance-does it constitute an "in pro-
cess" or "end result" concept?
B. In Process or End Result?
Commentators and scholars agree that the warranty of workman-
like performance is not an end result warranty such as the warranty
of merchantability under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code.116 Indeed, unlike the warranty of merchantability and the war-
ranty of habitability,117 the implied warranty of workmanlike per-
114. See text accompanying notes 216-227, infra.
115. See text accompanying notes 228-243, infra, for discussion of the economic loss
rule.
116. See William K. Jones, Economic Losses Caused by Construction Deficiencies: The
Competing Regimes of Contract and Tort, 59 U. CiN. L. REV. 1051, 1059-60
(1991)(proper efforts contracts imposes liability only for breaches of the applica-
ble standard of care while result-oriented contracts impose absolute liability);
Murray H. Wright & Edward E. Nicholas, III, The Collision of Tort and Contract
in the Construction Industry, 21 U. RICH L. REV. 457, 463-64 (1987)(design profes-
sionals do not warrant an accurate result, but that they will exercise due care in
the provision of services); Hal G. Block, As the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Ar-
chitect's Expanded Liability Under Design-Build/Construction Contracting, 17 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 18 n.86 (1984) (the warranty of workmanlike performance is
a warranty not to act negligently); Greenfield, supra note 22, at 666 (the implied
warranty of workmanlike performance requires non-negligent performance and
not a guarantee of results); Note, Extension of Warranty Concept to Service-Sales
Contracts, 31 IND. L.J. 367, 374 (1956)(service provider under obligation to per-
form in workmanlike manner possesses duty to perform and workmanlike man-
ner which is not a guarantee of results).
117. However, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 126-130, infra, the war-
ranty of habitability is not always characterized as an "end result" warranty.
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formance is an "in process" concept. "In process" refers to those
situations in which the liability of the service provider hinges on the
nature of the conduct he or she provides when rendering services.
Therefore "in process" is to be contrasted with a "true warranty" in
that the former focuses on conduct, while the latter focuses on the end
result.n8 Accordingly, conformance by the service provider with the
governing standard of care will more than likely relieve it of liability
for defects resulting from its performance. 19 As one commentator
stated:
The "proper efforts" standard is common in service contracts ..... In general,
courts construe these contracts as imposing no more than an obligation to em-
ploy proper efforts, in conformity with standards of the profession, and there
is no breach even if the objective of the contract is not achieved-the patient
dies, the lawsuit is lost, the building collapses-as long as the contracting
party has made the proper effort.-2 0
Thus, consistent with a notion of a gap filler, the principal function of
the warranty of workmanlike performance is to expose the implicit
understanding that the service provider engage in a minimal level of
care.
C. Independent of Warranty of Habitability?
Does the warranty of workmanlike performance have an identity
separate and distinct from the warranty of habitability? Moreover,
Whether the warranty of habitability is viewed as an "in process" or "end result"
concept depends primarily on the way in which it is defined. In those jurisdic-
tions where the warranty of habitability is deemed a true warranty, a builder's
obligation is absolute. "The home buyer is interested in a result, a habitable
dwelling conforming to community standards, and a structure which falls short of
this object amounts to inadequate performance." Jones, supra note 116, at 1059.
118. Maritime law recognizes an implied warranty of workmanlike performance with
respect to maritime services contracts. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 133-34 (1956); United States v. C-Way Constr. Co., 909 F.2d
259, 263 (7th Cir. 1990); Howard M. McCormack, Warranties and Disclaimers, 62
TUL. L. REv. 549, 560-61 (1988). The warranty is recognized in this context as a
means of mitigating the liability exposure of vessel owners to injured longshore-
men. United States v. C-Way Constr. Co., 909 F.2d at 263; Brian J. Becker, Note,
64 NoTRE DME L. REv. 246, 253-54 (1989). The warranty entitles a vessel owner
to initiate an indemnity action against a stevedoring contractor for the latter's
breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance implicitly incorporated in
the stevedoring contract. McCormack, supra at 560; Unites States v. C-Way Con-
str. Co., 909 F.2d at 263. In some instances, the remedy afforded by the warranty
is considered applicable even when the contractor's conduct was non-negligent
and is therefore treated as an end-result warranty. Becker, supra, at 254. See
generally Cleatous J. Simmons, Note, Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Per-
formance-One Who Agrees to Provide Maritime Services Impliedly Agrees to
Perform in a Diligent and Workmanlike Manner, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 147
(1976).
119. Greenfield, supra note 2, at 666; Jones, supra note 116, at 1059-60. See authorities
cited in notes 5-7, supra.
120. Jones, supra note 116, at 1059.
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how does a gap filler conceptualization of the warranty of workman-
like performance assist in responding to this question? As a initial
matter, examination of these issues requires a comparative analysis of
the concepts embodied in both the warranty of habitability and the
warranty of workmanlike performance. It also warrants examination
of the interests sought to be protected within the rubric of the two
theories. Accordingly, consideration of these questions begins with a
brief review of the warranty of habitability.
In Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 21 the Ohio Supreme Court initiated
the American demise of caveat emptor 22 in holding that an implied
warranty of good and workmanlike construction and habitability was
121. 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819, 821 (1957). The following year, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court recognized a home purchaser's claim premised on the war-
ranty of habitability against a builder-vendor. Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 329
P.2d 474 (Wash. 1958). Shortly thereafter other states followed suit. See gener-
ally Peter J. Shedd, The Implied Warranty of Habitability New Implications,
New Applications, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 291 (1980)(identifying and discussing the pace
at which courts adopted the warranty of habitability).
122. See generally Walter H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE
L.J. 1133 (1931)(discussing the history and meaning of caveat emptor). See also,
Roy Ryden Anderson, Disclaiming the Implied Warranties of Habitability and
Good Workmanship in the Sale of New Houses: The Supreme Court of Texas and
The Duty to Read the Contracts You Sign, 15 TEx. TEcH L. REV. 517, 524-27
(1984)(outlining the origins and premises of caveat emptor); Hal G. Block, supra
note 116, at 21 (noting caveat emptor was premised on equal bargaining positions
and arms length bargaining).
In England, the abandonment of the caveat emptor doctrine began in Miller v.
Cannon Hill Estates Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113 where the court in dictum announced
that an implied warranty of habitability should attach to the sale of a house to be
erected. In announcing this dictum, the Miller court reasoned that implication of
the warranty was justified given that
the whole object, as both parties know, is that there shall be erected a
house in which the intended purchaser shall come to live. It is the very
nature and essence of the transaction between the parties that he will
have a house put up there which is fit for him to come into as a dwelling-
house. It is plain that in those circumstances there is an implication of
law that the house shall be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is
required, that is for human dwelling.
Id. at 121. William D. Grand, Implied and Statutory Warranties in the Sale of
Real Estate: The Demise of Caveat Emptor, 15 REAL EsT. L.J. 44, 45 (1986)(recog-
nizing the demise of caveat emptor as beginning with the Miller dictum); Block,
supra note 116, at 22 (Miller represents the first breach in the citadel of caveat
emptor).
Perry v. Sharon Development Co., [1937] 4 All. E.R. 390, expressly adopted the
Miller dictum and implied a warranty of good and workmanlike performance and
habitability into every contract for the erection of a house. Id. at 395. It should be
noted that the court in Perry encountered difficulty adopting the dictum stated in
Miller to the situation before it. In Miller the court limited the proposed war-
ranty to houses being constructed. In Perry, the house was substantially com-
pleted. The court avoided the limitation imposed on application of the warranty
in Miller by concluding that the house was unfinished for purposes of applying
the Miller dictum. Id.
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implied into every contract for the sale of an unfinished house.12 3
Eventually, the warranty of habitability was extended to the sale of a
completed house. 4 Today, the applicability of the implied warranty
of habitability to homes is recognized in virtually all states.32 5
The implied warranty of habitability has been defined "as a guar-
antee by the builder-vendor that the structure will have no defects of
a nature that substantially impairs the enjoyment of the residence."'126
Most courts construe the foregoing to mean that the warranty of hab-
itability is breached only in those instances when defects are of such a
nature that a home is rendered uninhabitable.127 Thus a fundamental
difference between the implied warranty of habitability and the war-
ranty of workmanlike performance emerges. The former is an "end
result" concept where conduct or the manner in which performance is
conducted is irrelevant. As such, the warranty of habitability repre-
sents a form of strict liability'2s since the adequacy of the completed
structure and not the manner of performance by the builder governs
liability.29
123. See Anderson, supra note 122, at 530 (identifying Vanderschier as the first Amer-
ican case implying a warranty of habitability).
124. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) is acknowledged as the
first case to extend the warranty of habitability to transactions involving com-
pleted homes. Anderson, supra note 122, at 530. See Grand, supra note 122, at 45
(noting Ohio was the first state to recognize this implied warranty in the sale of
uncompleted homes and Colorado was the first state to extend such warranties to
the sale of completed homes).
125. Michael D. Lieder, Constructing a New Action for Negligent Infliction of Eco-
nomic Loss: Building on Cardoz and Coase, 66 WASH. L. REV. 937, 949-50
(1991) (noting widespread recognition of the warranty); Frona M. Powell & Jane
P. Mallor, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Commercial
Real Estate, 68 WASH. U.L.Q. 305, 306 (1990) (also recognizing the widespread ap-
plication of the warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes).
Notwithstanding its significance, the warranty of habitability is of limited
scope. The protections it affords purchasers of residential property typically have
not been extended to protect purchasers of commercial or investment properties.
See Lieder, supra, at 959 (most courts refuse to give commercial and investment
purchasers the protection of the implied warranty); Powell & Mallor, supra, at
331-34 (while acknowledging the general rule, arguing for extension of the war-
ranty of habitability to commercial purchasers for the same policy reasons sup-
porting application of warranty to residential purchasers).
126. Edie Lindsay, Comment, Strict Liability and the Building Industry, 33 EMORY
L.J. 175, 204 (1984).
127. Id. "[Tihe implied warranty of habitability protects only against relatively sub-
stantial defects. As a general rule, the complaint must relate to design or work-
manship defects that render the property unsuitable for its intended use."
Powell & Mallor, supra note 125, at 314.
128. Powell & Mallor, supra note 125 at 312-13.
129. Id. Jeff Clarkson, Note, Implied Warranties of Quality in Texas Home Sales:
How Many Promises to Keep?, 24 Hous. L. REV. 605, 615 (1987)(the adequacy of
the completed structure is the focus of the warranty of habitability); Bruce R.
Toole & Peter F. Habein, The Warranty of Habitability: A Bill of Rights For
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Despite this critical distinction, confusion surrounds the relation-
ship between the warranties of habitability and workmanlike per-
formance in the construction context. This confusion results, to some
extent, from language often employed to describe the concept of the
implied warranty of habitability. For instance, "implied warranty of
workmanship" or "workmanlike quality" are terms often used to de-
scribe the concept embodied in the implied warranty of habitability.130
1. Unitary Concepts
However, linguistic casualness fails completely to account for the
confusion surrounding the relationship between the two concepts.
Different conceptualizations of the notion of an implied warranty of
habitability contribute to the failure to clearly distinguish the con-
cepts. Therefore, the scope and breadth of the warranty of habitabil-
ity will often dictate its relationship with the workmanlike
performance concept.
Some courts define the implied warranty of habitability so as to
encompass the warranty of workmanlike performance. In these cases,
the warranties of habitability and workmanlike performance are dis-
cussed together with little or no attempt to differentiate them.131 In
Homebuyers, 44 MoNT. L. REV. 159, 161-62 (1983)(breach of warranty of habitabil-
ity can occur in the absence of negligence whereas the workmanlike performance
warranty is closely related to the service provider's conduct).
130. See e.g., Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Ky. 1969)(phrase implied war-
ranty that major structural features are constructed in workmanlike manner
used to express court's adoption of warranty of habitability); Lempke v. Dagenais,
547 A.2d 290, 291 (N.H. 1988)(implied warranty of workmanlike quality); Dixon v.
Mountain City Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tenn. 1982)(implied warranty of
good workmanship and materials).
131. See e.g., Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427, 430 (Ariz. 1984)(using
language suggesting warranty of habitability encompasses warranty to perform in
workmanlike manner). But see Columbia W. Corp. v. Vela, 592 P.2d 1294, 1299
(Ariz. App. 1979)(indicating warranties are separate); Lucas v. Canadian Valley
Area Vocational Technical Sch., 824 P.2d 1140, 1141 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992)("When
a builder-vendor sells a new home, there is an implied warranty, as a matter of
law, that the home is or will be completed in a workmanlike manner and will be
reasonably fit for occupancy as a place of abode"). But see, Elden v. Simmons, 631
P.2d 739, 740 (Okla. 1981)(using language which perhaps suggests obligations of
workmanship and habitability create distinct warranties).
In Klos v. Gockel, 554 P.2d 1349 (Wash. 1976), plaintiff alleged defects includ-
ing the separation of a door frame from the wall of house and buckling and sink-
ing of front yard patio slabs. The court concluded that these defects did not give
rise to breach of the implied warranty of habitability which it stated provides that
the dwelling "is sufficiently free from major structural defects, and is constructed
in a workmanlike manner, so as to meet the standard of workmanlike quality
then prevailing at the time and place of construction." Id. at 1352 (quoting Hart-
ley v. Ballou, 209 S.E.2d 776 (N.C. 1974)). As discussed below, a different result
could have occurred if the court had viewed the warranty of workmanlike per-
formance as an independent concept. The alleged defects could have given rise to
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this group of cases, the obligation to perform in a workmanlike man-
ner becomes a component or prong of the warranty of habitability.132
An important consequence of defining the warranty of habitability as
incorporating the warranty of workmanlike performance is to limit
the function of the latter and deprive it of vitality as an independent
basis for recovery for defective performance.
2. Distinct and Independent Concepts
Notwithstanding the above, there exist sound bases for conceptual-
izing the warranty of workmanlike performance as a concept distinct
and independent of the warranty of habitability.133 As such, a failure
of a builder to perform in a workmanlike manner should be actionable
even in instances where habitability is not impaired. This was the out-
come in Evans v. Stiles.134 In reaching a decision in favor of the home-
owner, the Texas Supreme Court first noted that in earlier decisions it
had indicated that builder/vendors warrant workmanship and habita-
an action for its breach even though they may not have been sufficient to estab-
lish that the structure was uninhabitable and thus in violation of the habitability
warranty.
132. In Kirk v. Ridgeway, 373 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Iowa 1985), the court identified the
following elements of the implied warranty of workmanship in the sale of real
estate, including- (1) house is fit for its intended purpose; or (2) is constructed in a
good and workmanlike manner.
Similarly, in Gaito v. Auman, 327 S.E.2d 870 (N.C. 1985), the North Carolina
Supreme Court defined the warranty of habitability as follows: "In every contract
for the sale of a recently completed dwelling, and in every contract for the sale of
a dwelling, then under construction, the vendor,... shall be held to impliedly
warrant... the dwelling,... is sufficiently free from major structural defects,
and is constructed in a workmanlike manner, so as to meet the standard of work-
manlike quality then prevailing at the time and place of construction .... " Id. at
874.
See Roper v. Springlake Dev. Co., 789 P.2d 483, 485 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990)("The
contractual responsibilities of the builder of a new house which are implicit in the
concept 'implied warranty of habitability' include the buyer's right to both a home
that is built in workmanlike manner and one that is suitable for habitation").
On occasion, the workmanlike performance prong of the warranty of habita-
bility permits recovery for minor defects under a habitability theory. See Deisch
v. Jay, 790 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Wyo. 1990). Query whether the operative effect of
permitting recovery for minor defects based on violation of the workmanlike per-
formance prong of the habitability warranty is in essence the same as in those
instances when the recovery for such defects would be permitted for breach of a
warranty of workmanlike performance which is deemed distinct and independ-
ent of habitability.
133. In England, the warranties expressly adopted in Perry v. Sharon have been con-
strued as distinct. This was made clear in Hancock v. B.W. Brazier Ltd, [1966] 2
All E.R. 901, 904 [1966] and Billyjack v. Leyland Construction Co., [1968] 1 All
E.R. 783, 789. In Billyjack, the obligations of builders who enter into building
contracts were defined as threefold: (a) to perform the work in a workmanlike
manner, (b) to supply proper materials; and (c) to build a house that is habitable.
134. 689 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1985).
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bility. In recognizing the distinct identity of the two warranties, it
held that "[t]he implied warranty of construction in a good work-
manlike manner is independent of the implied warranty of
habitability... ,"135
Similarly in Aronsohn v. Mandara,136 the warranty of habitability
was found not to apply to claims involving an improperly constructed
patio.137 However, the peripheral nature of the defects did not elimi-
nate a possible claim for breach of the warranty of workmanlike per-
formance. In reaching this conclusion, the New Jersey Supreme
Court discussed the relationship between the warranties of workman-
ship and habitability.
The doctrine of implied warranty of habitability is therefore inapplicable
under the circumstances here. That does not mean, of course, that in other
situations a breach of an implied warranty of reasonable workmanship could
not also constitute a breach of an implied warranty of habitability, if the con-
dition were sufficiently serious to affect the home's habitability.1 38
After properly noting that the warranty of workmanlike performance
rests on an implied contractual provision,1 3 9 the court remanded the
matter for determination of whether the warranty of workmanlike
135. Id. at 400. Other courts emphatically conclude that the workmanship obligation
is conceptually distinct from the warranty of habitability. Schmeck v. Sea Oats
Condominium Ass'n Inc., 441 So. 2d 1092, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(devel-
oper may be liable for breach of warranty to construct in workmanlike manner or
for failure to provide a habitable dwelling); Chandler v. Madsen, 642 P.2d 1028,
1031 (Mont. 1982) (builder vendor of residence impliedly warrants both its habita-
bility and its workmanlike manner of construction); Kennedy v. Columbia Lum-
ber & Mfg. Co., 384 S.E.2d 730, 736 (S.C. 1989)(holding implied warranty of
workmanlike service is distinct from the warranty of habitability); Meadowbrook
Condominium Ass'n v. South Burlington Realty Corp., 565 A.2d 238, 240-41 (Vt.
1989)(claim alleging breach of warranty of workmanship may exist notwithstand-
ing fact defects fail to render dwelling uninhabitable); Toole & Habein, supra
note 129, at 162 (proposing that the court in Chandler v. Madsen recognized two
independent warranties, the warranty of workmanlike performance and the war-
ranty of habitability).
See Bednarski v. Hideout Homes & Realty Inc., 711 F. Supp. 823, 827 (M.D. Pa.
1989)(rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss, court comments that Pennsylvania
courts recognize implied warranties of habitability and workmanlike construc-
tion for residential dwellings); Council of Unit Owners v. Simpler, 603 A.2d 792,
795 (Del. Super. 1991)(suggesting warranties of habitability and workmanship are
separate and distinct); George B. Gilmore Co. v. Garrett, 582 So. 2d 387, 391 (Miss.
1991)(concluding that builder owes duties of workmanlike performance and hab-
itability to homeowner).
Jones, supra note 116, at 1062 ("Most courts treat the requirement of work-
manlike performance as separable from the requirement of habitability; if a defi-
ciency violates community standards of workmanship, it is actionable whether or
not habitability is impaired").
136. 484 A.2d 675 (N.J. 1984).
137. Id. at 682.
138. Id. at 682.
139. Id. at 683.
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performance had been breached even though defects were not of such
a nature to invoke the warranty of habitability.
In addition to noting that the warranties rest on different premises
which justify treating them as separable, some courts focus on the dif-
ferent requirements for determining breach. Wimmer v. Down East
Properties, Inc.,140 falls within this category. There the court stated
that
[defendants'] argument confuses the implied warranty of habitability, breach
of which requires that the defect be of sufficient magnitude to render the
dwelling unsuitable for habitation, and the implied warranty of workmanlike
performance, which requires only that a house be constructed in a reasonably
skillful and workmanlike manner. The test is one of reasonableness, not
perfection, the standard being, ordinarily, the quality of work that would be
done by a worker of average skill and intelligence.1
4 1
In rejecting defendants' argument that defects in a chimney were in-
sufficient to constitute breach of the implied warranty of habitability
and, therefore, any warranty, the court concluded such leaks could
constitute breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance.142
Recognizing habitability and workmanlike performance as distinct
concepts is consistent with the underlying nature of the two concepts
and the different rationales which underlie them. As noted above, the
implied warranty of habitability is a result oriented concept143 based
upon specific public policy considerations. These include the propriety
of shifting the costs of defective construction from consumers to build-
ers who are presumed better able to absorb such costs; the nature of
the transaction which involves the purchase of a manufactured prod-
uct, a house; the buyer's inferior bargaining position; the foreseeable
risk of harm resulting from defects to consumers; consumer difficulty
in ascertaining defective conditions; and justifiable reliance by con-
sumers on a builder's expertise and implied representations. 144
In contrast, the implied warranty of workmanlike performance fo-
cuses on the service provider's conduct.145 Moreover, a gap filler con-
140. 406 A.2d 88 (Me. 1979). Accord Meadowbrook Condominium Ass'n v. South Bur-
lington Realty Corp., 565 A.2d 238, 240-41 (Vt. 1989).
141. Id. at 93.
142. Id. at 93.
143. See discussion accompanying notes 126-129, supra.
144. See Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972); De Roche v. Dame,
413 N.E.2d 366 (N.Y. 1980); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 560-61 (Tex. 1968);
Leo Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule,
14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961); Paul G. Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty
of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633 (1965); E.F. Roberts, The
Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.
REv. 835 (1967); Powell & Mallor, supra note 125; Shedd, supra note 121.
145. The distinctions between the two concepts has been described as follows:
[Tihe two warranties are distinct even though they seek the same result.
'Good and workmanlike' is a standard based on the subjective considera-
tion of those in the construction field with average skill and intelli-
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ceptualization of the workmanlike performance obligation would
validate affording it an existence distinct from the warranty of habita-
bility. When formulated as a gap filler, the warranty of workmanlike
performance grows out of the contractual relationship between ser-
vice-providers and service-recipients and the common sense146 per-
formance expectations arising from the relationship.147 Therefore,
the warranty provides remedies which preceded recognition of the
warranty of habitability. Moreover, it constitutes a separate basis for
granting relief for a service-provider's failure to comply with the im-
plied standard of performance. Thus, notwithstanding that the con-
cepts share similar ultimate goals, they are premised on different
considerations and should be viewed as distinct. Because of this, it
would seem theoretically unsound to absorb the warranty of work-
manlike performance into the warranty of habitability in such a way
that it loses its separate identity and as a consequence limits remedial
options available to dissatisfied service recipients.
To the extent that such an encapsulation occurs, at a minimum it
should occur only after consideration of the differences between the
two concepts and a thorough examination of the implications of such
an approach. In engaging in any such exercise, viewing the warranty
of workmanlike performance as a gap filler provides a conceptual
foundation and framework. This conceptualization can thus serve as a
vehicle, or at least a point of departure, for exploring possible distinc-
tions between it and the warranty of habitability. Starting with this
conceptualization as a basis for examination, one can make reasoned
decisions based on theoretical, common sense, and policy considera-
tions concerning the interrelationship between the concepts.
gence-it does not require perfection. The implied warranty of good and
workmanlike construction focuses on the builder's conduct while the
warranty of habitability focuses on the adequacy of the completed struc-
ture. The two warranties parallel one another, since they both require
the builder to build structures free of unreasonable defects. Some states,
like Texas before Evans, fail to recognize a distinction between the two
warranties, while others use the warranty of good and workmanlike con-
struction as a basis for developing the warranty of habitability.
Jeff Clarkson, Note, Implied Warranties of Quality in Texas Home Sales: How
Many Promises to Keep?, 24 Hous. L. REV. 605, 617-18 (1987).
146. With respect to common sense, it does not require much imagination to envision
situations where defects in the construction of a house demonstrate the failure to
use good workmanship even though the house is habitable. For instance, defects
in a patio and driveway would not likely render a house uninhabitable but could
result in breach of the workmanship warranty. Evans v. Stiles, Inc., 689 S.W.2d
399, 400 (Tex. 1985).
147. The overriding public policy justification for the creation and recognition of the
warranty of habitability, affording greater protection to consumers, would also
seem to warrant recognition of the concepts as providing an independent basis for
recovery. Indeed, it would seem ironic to define the warranty of habitability in
such a way that it limits and circumscribes an independent basis of recovery and
thus limits a consumer's remedial options.
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D. The Theoretical Basis of the Workmanlike Performance Warranty-
Contract or Tort?
We now shift our examination to consider a principal issue with
which courts grapple: does breach of the warranty give rise to liability
and remedies which are based on contract or tort? As concerns the
conceptualization of the warranty, the importance of resolving this
question is two-fold. First, attempts to determine the substantive ba-
sis for actions arising out of breach of the warranty of workmanlike
performance represent an effort to arrive at a formulation of the con-
cept. However, as discussed below, these efforts tend to be deficient
since critical analysis of the warranty's theoretical premise is tangen-
tial to other considerations.148 Moreover, such judicial efforts often
fail as a means of enhancing understanding of the warranty and as
mechanisms for resolving the diverse issues which ensue from its ap-
plication. Second, the import of judicial efforts to determine the theo-
retical premises of the warranty lies in the impact characterization of
the warranty, as ex contractu or ex delicto, has on a party's rights and
remedies. The latter point is discussed first.
1. Significance of Characterization
Important consequences flow from the substantive characteriza-
tion assigned to the warranty of workmanlike performance. Deter-
mining the substantive nature of an action for breach of warranty is a
prerequisite to determining whether to apply the tort statute of limita-
tions, or the typically longer contract limitations period.149 Similarly,
the substantive characterization afforded the warranty of workman-
like performance will determine the availability of comparative negli-
gence and indemnification defenses in assessing fault and damages.150
148. For instance, courts often focus not on the theoretical premise of the warranty of
workmanlike performance but on the economic loss rule in determining whether
improper performance gives rise to an action in tort or contract or both. Refer to
discussion of text accompanying notes 172-175, infra.
149. KEETON, ET AL., supra note 8, at § 92, 664-65. Examples of the necessity of charac-
terizing an action for breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance in or-
der to determine the applicable statute of limitations may be found in: Velotta v.
Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 147, 150-51 (Ohio 1982); Securities-
Intermountain, Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co., 611 P.2d 1158, 1159-60 (Or. 1980). In Cer-
tain-Teed Products Corp. v. Bell, 422 S.W.2d 719, 721-22 (Tex. 1968), the Texas
Supreme Court held that "a warranty which the law implies from the existence
of a written contract is as much a part of the writing as the express terms of the
contract, and the action to enforce such a warranty is governed by the statute
pertaining to written contracts." See David L. Butler, Comment, The Implied
Warranty of Habitability-Contract or Tort?, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 207, 208 (1979).
150. See e.g., Haysville U.S.D. No. 261 v. GAF Corp. 666 P.2d 192, 200-201 (Kan.
1983) (comparative negligence and implied comparative indemnity are applicable
to tort but not contract claims); Schneider Nat'1 Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843
P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1992).
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The same is true with regard to the applicability of municipal immuni-
ties and the subject matter jurisdiction of tribunals.1S1 Finally, the na-
ture of the damages recoverable rests to a large extent on the
substantive characterization assigned to a claim for breach of the war-
ranty of workmanlike performance.152 In short, determining whether
actions for breach of the workmanlike performance obligation sound
in tort or contract is relevant to significant substantive and procedural
rights.
2. Current Status of Law-Ex Contractu or Ex Delicto?
A review of the cases indicates uncertainty as to the substantive
cause or causes of action available for breach of the warranty of work-
manlike performance. Failure to perform in a workmanlike manner
has been said to give rise to an action sounding in contract only. Other
courts have consistently held that breach of the workmanlike per-
formance warranty gives rise to tort actions only. Still others find that
remedies for breach of the warranty can be pursued under both tort
and contract theory.
These divergent opinions reflect that the precise doctrinal dimen-
sions of the warranty of workmanlike performance remains unde-
fined, and also reveal a fundamental lack of comprehension of the
concept's underlying nature. As a result of confusion regarding the
warranty's content, it has fallen into a gray area where tort and con-
tract intersect.
After examining the most significant doctrinal approaches which
courts have taken in attempts to characterize the warranty, this article
concludes that these efforts largely fail. It proposes, however, that
conceptualizing the warranty of workmanlike performance as a gap
filler provides a workable framework for enhanced understanding.
Moreover, a gap filler formulation will facilitate judicial consideration
of relevant factors often ignored in decisions defining the substantive
basis of the warranty of workmanlike performance.
151. J.L. Healy Constr. Co. v. State, Dep't of Rds., 236 Neb. 759, 463 N.W. 2d 813, 816
(Neb. 1990)(court's subject matter jurisdiction for purposes of waiver of immu-
nity is determined by whether claim rests on tort or contract); KEETON, ET AL.,
supra note 8, at § 92, 664.
152. Morrow v. L.A. Goldschmidt Assocs., Inc., 492 N.E.2d 181, 186 (111. 1986)(as a gen-
eral matter, claim must be construed as alleging a tort in order to state a cause of
action for punitive damages which typically are not recoverable in contract); Ge-
orgetown Realty, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 7, 11 (Or. 1992)(whether a claim
lies in contract, tort or both determines the damages which may be recoverable
and the applicable statute of limitations); KEETON, ET AL., supra note 8, at § 92,
665 ("Generally speaking, the tort remedy is likely to be more advantageous to
the injured party in the greater number of cases, if only because it will so often
permit the recovery of greater damages. Under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,
the damages recoverable for breach of contract are limited to those within the
contemplation of the defendant at the time the contract was made ... ").
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a. Ex Contractu
An approach embraced by one group of cases is to declare emphati-
cally that breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance does
not give rise to an action sounding in tort. Remedies for improper per-
formance and breach of the warranty must be pursued on the basis of
contract.
The reasoning employed in Fuchs v. Parsons Construction Com-
pany'5 3 is representative of that relied upon by courts which have
adopted this approach. Plaintiff alleged that his action against a con-
tractor for improper construction of a building sounded in tort.154 The
contractor asserted that the plaintiff's action was premised on con-
tract.155 In agreeing with the contractor, the court initially focused on
the contract as being the source of the duties which the contractor
owed to the owner.1 56 In this regard, the court stated that "[t]he con-
tract concerned in this case prescribed the scope and manner of com-
pleting the work to be done by the contractor.... The whole of the
obligation of the contractor was contractual and any failure of per-
formance afforded a resort to an action for breach of contract."157
The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the common law
duty to perform work in a workmanlike manner transformed what
would have been a contract action into one which sounded in tort.158
Employing an independent duty rationale to deny plaintiff's negli-
gence claim, the court concluded that a tort action must be premised
on the existence of a duty which arises independently of the contrac-
tual obligation.159 In 1988 the Nebraska Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Fuchs reasoning in L.J. Vontz Construction Co. v. State.160
This line of reasoning also surfaced in Woodward v. Chirco Constr.
Co.161 a 1984 Arizona case, where the court held that failure to per-
form in a workmanlike manner does not give rise to an action sound-
ing in tort.162 The distinction between the differing interests sought to
153. 166 Neb. 188, 88 N.W.2d 648 (1958).
154. Id. at 191, 88 N.W.2d at 651.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 192, 88 N.W.2d at 652.
157. Id. at 193-194, 88 N.W.2d at 652.
158. Id. at 199-202, 88 N.W.2d at 654-56.
159. Id. at 199-202, 88 N.W.2d at 654-56.
160. 230 Neb. 377, 382-84, 432 N.W.2d 7, 11-12 (1988).
161. 687 P.2d 1269 (Ariz. 1984).
162. Id. at 1270-71. It should be noted that in Woodward, the court examined the war-
ranty of workmanlike performance in the context of the "warranty of workman-
like performance and habitability." Thus it appears that the court incorporated
the warranty of workmanlike performance into the warranty of habitability con-
cept rather than recognizing it as an independent duty. This should not, however,
lessen the relevance of the court's analysis as to whether breach of the warranty
gives rise to tort remedies and damages. Indeed, the argument could be made
that in the case where the warranty of habitability is involved a tort action should
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be protected pursuant to tort and contract, respectively, supplied the
rationale for the court's holding.163 The service recipient's desire to
protect its expectation interest was identified as underscoring the con-
tractual nature of the workmanlike performance warranty. In this re-
gard, the court stated "[w]here the plaintiff seeks only to receive what
the builder promised to deliver, or damages to compensate him for
[structural] deficiencies in the final product, [the action] arises from
the contract of sale between the parties and is basically contractual in
nature."164
As in Fuchs, the court focused on the non-existence of an in-
dependent duty to support a tort action for negligence. Thus while the
court noted the contractual nature of the warranty of workmanlike
performance, it also recognized that in a proper case breach of the
warranty could also give rise to a tort action.165 Yet the viability of a
tort action for negligence would depend on the existence and breach of
a duty independent of that created by virtue of the warranty of work-
manlike performance.166 Applying this logic, the Arizona Supreme
Court concluded that under such circumstances recovery would be
permissible in tort but only to the extent that the resulting damage is
to other property or persons. 167 To illustrate this point, the court
noted that if the fireplace was improperly constructed, plaintiff could
recover in tort for damage to personal property or personal injury
be available inasmuch as it represents the imposition of a duty premised on public
policy considerations. Therefore, the court's decision not to recognize a tort cause
of action arguably carries greater force.
163. Id. at 1270-71.
164. Id. at 1271 (quoting Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 578 P.2d 637 (Colo.
1978) where the court held breach of the workmanship warranty does not give
rise to a tort cause of action).
The contractual nature of the warranty provided the premise for rejecting a
tort claim for breach of an implied obligation to perform in a skillful manner in
Watts Homes, Inc. v. Alonzo, 452 So. 2d 1331 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984). Other courts
rejecting tort action as a basis of recovery for breach of the warranty of work-
manlike performance include: Stephens v. Creel, 429 So. 2d 278 (Ala. 1983)(con-
tract statute of limitations applies to action alleging failure to perform in
workmanlike manner); Cacace v. Morcaldi, 435 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Conn. Sup. Ct.
1981)(the essence of an action alleging failure to perform in workmanlike man-
ner is essentially one for breach of contract. The obligation to perform in a work-
manlike manner constitutes an implied covenant of a service contract); Gaybis v.
Palm, 93 A.2d 269, 272 (Md. 1952)(contractor failing to perform with care and
skill is liable for breach of contract); Sims v. Ryland Group, Inc., 378 A.2d 1, 4
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977)(breach of warranty of workmanlike performance is
contractual in nature). See Lochrane Eng'g, Inc. v. Willingham Realgrowth Inv.
Fund, Ltd., 552 So. 2d 228, 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)(the duty to deliver serv-
ices in a workmanlike manner is contractual).
165. Woodward v. Chirco Constr. Co., 687 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Ariz. 1984).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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caused by its collapse.168
The Woodward court also emphasized that the mere fact that the
warranty of workmanlike performance and habitability is imposed or
arises as a matter of law is an insufficient basis, alone, to transform
this contractual obligation into one premised on tort. 69 The court's
characterization of the duty which is implied by virtue of the warranty
of workmanlike performance comports with the conceptualization of
the warranty as a gap filler. This significant issue is discussed in
greater detail below.170 Suffice it to say, the court determined the sub-
stantive basis of the warranty of workmanlike performance to be
contractual.'71
b. Economic Loss Rationale
Other courts have focused not only on the existence of an in-
dependent duty but have also explicitly relied on the economic loss
doctrine to assist them in determining the substantive nature of the
warranty of workmanlike performance. Such an approach was
adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Morrow v. L.A. Goldschmidt
Assoc.,172 where purchasers of townhouses alleged tort claims in addi-
tion to breach of express and implied warranty claims for construction
defects in the townhouses. 73 Defendant's failure to perform in a
workmanlike manner provided the essence of plaintiffs' action. 74 Re-
jecting plaintiffs' tort claim, the court found that the existence of a
tort action was dependent on the breach of a duty independent of
those arising by virtue of the contractual relationship. Distinguishing
the remedial goals of tort and contract substantive actions and em-
168. Id.
169. Woodward v. Chirco Constr. Co., 687 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Ariz. 1984); Fuchs v. Par-
sons Construction Co., 166 Neb. 188, 202, 88 N.W.2d 648, 656 (1958); Ellis v. Robert
C. Morris, Inc., 513 A.2d 951 (N.H. 1986)(reversed on other grounds). In Ellis the
court held that breach of the obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner
sounds in tort. Id. at 954. In Lempke v. Dagenis, 547 A.2d 290, 291 (N.H. 1988),
the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld this aspect of its ruling in Ellis.
170. See discussion infra accompanying notes 216-226.
171. Even though the Woodward court stated that an action for breach of the war-
ranty of workmanlike performance sounds in contract, it left open the possibility
that a tort action might arise from the same set of facts. The existence of a tort
action was deemed dependent on the nature of the resulting injury or damage to
persons or property. This aspect of the decision creates uncertainty regarding the
theoretical premise for the court's holding. The opinion suggests the court's con-
clusion that an action alleging breach of the warranty sounds in contract was
based on its perception of the warranty's inherently contractual nature. Yet the
court's focus on the nature of the resulting injury intimates that the economic
loss doctrine contributed in large measure to the theoretical characterization
which the court assigned the action.
172. 492 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1986).
173. Id. at 182-83.
174. Id. at 183.
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ploying the economic loss rule to further explain this distinction, the
court stated:
[P]laintiffs seek to recover only the costs of repairs to their homes caused
by defendants' alleged faulty workmanship ..... T]he plaintiffs here have not
alleged a harm "above and beyond disappointed expectations." (citation omit-
ted). They do not complain that the defects caused an accident which resulted
in physical injury or damage to other property. Indeed, contrary to the find-
ings of the appellate court, nowhere in plaintiffs' complaint is it alleged that
the defects were a threat to health or safety. As such, the plaintiffs essentially
are complaining that they did not receive the benefit of their bargain-a harm
which is appropriately remedied by bringing an action for breach of con-
tract.... Where the construction defects do not cause physical injuries or
damage to other property, we are unwilling to impose tort liability on a
builder for breach of his contract with the purchaser, even if the breach was
wilful and wanton.1 7 5
175. Id. at 185; see Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1982), where the court
extended the economic loss concept as stated in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v.
National Tank Co. 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982) to preclude tort actions for economic
loss based upon breach of the duty to perform in a workmanlike manner. The
court based its denial of tort liability on the following reasoning-
To recover in negligence there must be a showing of harm above and
beyond disappointed expectations. A buyer's desire to enjoy the benefit
of his bargain is not an interest that tort law traditionally protects....
While the commercial expectations of this buyer have not been met by
the builder, the only danger to the plaintiff is that he [will] be forced to
incur additional expenses....
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 327 (ll. 1982). Accord J.L. Healy Con-
str. Co. v. State Dep't of Rds., 236 Neb. 759, 463 N.W.2d 813, 816-17 (1990)(breach
of contract action asserting a failure to perform will not give rise to tort action
unless there are allegations of loss to person or property. Action based on breach
of universal duty to perform in reasonable manner sounds in contract); La Vontz
Constr. Co., Inc. v. State, 230 Neb. 377, 382, 432 N.W.2d 7, 11-12 (1988)(allegation
of breach of warranty of workmanlike performance does not give rise to tort ac-
tion absent loss or damage to property or persons); Aronsohn v. Mandara, 484
A.2d 675, 683 (N.J. 1984)(suggesting in dictum that breach of implied warranty of
workmanlike performance, absent damage to other property or personal injury,
only gives rise to contract action); New Mea Constr. Corp. v. Harper, 497 A.2d 534,
540-41 (N.J. Super. 1985), quoting dictum in Aronsohn; Spillman v. American
Homes of Mocksville, Inc., 422 S.E.2d 740 (N.C. App. 1992)(tort action does not lie
in favor of party alleging failure to properly perform a contractual obligation);
Warfield v. Hicks, 370 S.E.2d 689, 694 (N.C. App. 1988)(economic loss rule pre-
cludes action in tort for improper performance of building contract where there
was no damage to other property or injury to persons); Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v.
Benham-Blair & Affiliates, Inc., 775 P.2d 797, 800-01 (Okla. 1989)(citing Wood-
ward, the court ruled that the nature of defendant's conduct and the injury deter-
mines whether tort action exists for breach of the warranty of workmanlike
performance. Tort liability is unavailable where defendant's default or injury fail
to implicate a duty existing independent of the contractual relationship. There-
fore, if injury is only to subject matter of contract, plaintiff is restricted to con-
tract action); Simpson v. Sumner County, 669 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. App.
1983) (interpreting prior Tennessee authority to suggest that action for breach of
implied warranty of workmanlike performance sounds in contract and absent
damage to other property a tort claim is not cognizable).
But see Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 384 S.E.2d 730 (N.C. 1989),
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In short, the court concluded that absent the breach of a duty owed to
plaintiffs independent of those created by virtue of their contractual
relationship, plaintiffs' tort cause of action must fail.
c. Ex Contractu and Ex Delicto
i. Nature of Damage Limitation
Often it is stated in the abstract that a contractor's breach of the
warranty of workmanlike performance will give rise to tort and con-
tract claims. More often than not, such blanket statements are mis-
leading inasmuch as the plaintiff's right to seek tort remedies is
circumscribed by the economic loss doctrine.
A series of Kansas cases illustrates the conceptual and practical un-
where the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the economic loss rule as the
determining factor in characterizing an action in tort and contract. The court
held that a builder may be held liable in tort for breach of the warranty of work-
manlike performance despite the fact that the buyer only suffers economic losses
if one of three conditions are present: "(1) the builder has violated an applicable
building code; (2) the builder has deviated from industry standards; or (3) the
builder has constructed housing that he knows or should know will pose serious
risks of physical harm." Id. at 738. According to the court, any one of the forego-
ing will provide a basis for establishing the existence of a duty independent of
contract which is essential to the viability of a tort claim.
By virtue of the definition of when and how breach of the warranty of work-
manlike performance occurs, the second criteria presented by the court would
arguably always provide the basis for a tort action since the plaintiff need only
establish that the builder failed to comply with the community standard of care.
Spillman v. American Homes of Mocksville, 422 S.E.2d 740 (N.C. App. 1992), casts
doubt on how expansively the Kennedy factors will be interpreted. There the
court, in refusing to permit a tort action to go forward in a case involving alleged
improper construction and installation of a mobile home, stated "a tort action
does not lie against a party to a contract who simply fails to properly perform the
terms of the contract, even if the failure to properly perform was due to the negli-
gent or intentional conduct of that party, when the injury resulting from the
breach is damage to the subject matter of the contract." Kennedy v. Columbia
Lumber & Mfg. Co., 384 S.E.2d 730, 740 (N.C. 1989). The court chose not to cite to
Kennedy and perhaps inferentially limits the Kennedy ruling to new home
purchases.
See also Lempke v. Dagenais, 547 A.2d 290 (N.H. 1988), where the court denied
recovery for economic loss premised on a negligence claim. Id. at 290-91. How-
ever, the court permitted recovery of purely economic loss for breach of warranty
of workmanlike quality which it seems to equate to or fold into the warranty of
habitability. Id at 296-97; Frantz v. Real Estate Marketing, Inc., 1993 WL 23593
(Ky. App. 1993) (characterizing the warranty of workmanlike performance as en-
compassed within the warranty of habitability which it labels the implied war-
ranty of workmanlike construction using suitable materials, court holds that pure
economic loss is recoverable for breach of the warranty); Arden Hills N. Homes
Assoc. v. Pemton, Inc., 475 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Minn. App. 1993)(economic loss rule
only applies to transactions within parameters of the Uniform Commercial Code
and therefore does not preclude tort action to recover loss due to premature dete-
rioration of siding on townhouse).
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certainties arising from such a vague generalization. In In Re Talbott's
Estate,176 the Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed earlier precedent in
holding that a plumbing subcontractor impliedly warranted to per-
form services in a good and workmanlike manner. Recognizing that
such an obligation was implied into the parties' contract, the court
noted the contractual nature of the duty. The court held that breach
of this contractual duty to use appropriate skill and to do a workman-
like job stated a breach of contract cause of action.177
While adhering to the general rule that a service provider im-
pliedly warrants to perform in a workmanlike manner, subsequent
Kansas cases cast doubt on the Talbott court's characterization of the
cause of action as contractual. For instance in Gilley v. Farmer,178 the
Kansas Supreme Court extended the implied warranty of workman-
like performance to services rendered by insurers.179 In discussing ap-
plication of the warranty in the contractor/contractee context, the
court concluded that
[w]here negligence on the part of the contractor results in breach of the im-
plied warranty, the breach may be tortious in origin, but it also gives rise to a
cause of action ex contractu. An action in tort may likewise be available to the
contractee and he may proceed against the contractor either in tort or in con-
tract; or he may proceed on both theories. 1 8 0
A similar statement was echoed several years later in Corral v. Rollins
Protective Services, Co.,181 a case involving services associated with the
installation and service of a fire and burglary alarm system. 8 2
176. 337 P.2d 986 (1959). Judicial statements, without limitation or explanation, pro-
nouncing the availability of tort and contract claims for breach of the workman-
like performance obligation are not uncommon. See, e.g., Corral v. Rollins
Protective Servs. Co., 732 P.2d 1260 (Kan. 1987); Mascarenas v. Jaramillo, 806 P.2d
59 (N.M. 1991). Closer examination reveals, however, the presence in many of
these cases, of the types of resulting damage which removes the economic loss
rule as a barrier to pursuing tort remedies and thereby limits the scope of such
broad statements of the rule. For example, in Davis v. New England Pest Control
Co., 576 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1990), the court without explanation or limitation held
that breach of the warranty gives rise to actions sounding both in tort and con-
tract. But the case involved physical damage to property unrelated to the service
provided such that the economic loss rule would not operate preclusively with
respect to a tort claim. Accord National Chain Co. v. Campbell, 487 A.2d 132, 136
(R.I. 1985) (holding trial court erred in not instructing jury on negligence count in
matter in which failure to hang wallpaper in workmanlike manner resulted in
damage to other property).
177. In Re Talbott's Estate, 337 P.2d 986, 991 (Kan. 1959).
178. 485 P.2d 1284 (1971).
179. Id. at 1289.
180. Id. at 1289.
181. 732 P.2d 1260, 1268 (Kan. 1987)(holding breach of the implied warranty of work-
manlike performance may give rise to both tort and contract actions).
182. The Corral court relied on precedent in Talbott to first extend the implied duty to
perform in a workmanlike manner to the situation before it. Id. at 1268-69. It
relied on Gilley in finding that breach of the duty gives rise to contract or tort
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Closer analysis reveals, however, that the holding of Gilley and
Corral are reconcilable with the contractual imprimatur the Talbott
court attached to actions asserting breach of the warranty of work-
manlike performance. The general rule pronounced in Gilley and
Corral belies the fact that the nature of the injury resulting from
breach of the obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner governs
the availability of tort remedies. Thus a tort action will be recognized
only where the service provider breaches a duty independent of its
contractual obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner.
The foregoing conclusion finds support in Haysville S.D. No. 261 v.
GAF Corp.,183 which involved claims against a roofing manufacturer,
architect and roofing contractor for damages occasioned by cracks
which appeared after the installation of new roofs. The plaintiff
school district alleged, among other things, that GAF breached its ser-
vice and inspection obligations. Determining the substantive nature of
defendant's obligations was deemed necessary to reaching a determi-
nation of whether the plaintiff's comparative fault could be used to
reduce the defendant's potential liability. Comparative negligence
and apportionment of fault is relevant to a tort action but not to a
contract action.18 4 The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that for
either express or implied warranties, absent proof of a breach causing
personal injury, death or physical damage to other property such that
an independent duty was implicated, the resulting damage would con-
stitute economic loss. Consequently, the liability and damages would
be governed by contract principles and the comparative negligence
statute would not apply.1S5
Wyoming cases provide another illustration of the type of theoreti-
cal and practical uncertainties which may potentially emanate from
generalized statements to the effect that breach of the warranty of
workmanlike performance is cognizable both in tort and contract. In
Cline v. Sawyer, 8 6 the court considered whether comparative negli-
gence should be taken into account in an action alleging breach of the
implied warranty to perform in a skillful and workmanlike man-
ner.1 8 7 A plumber contracted with builders of a trailer to install
plumbing.188 The builder's complaint sounded in contract.189 The
causes of action. Corral v. Rollins Protective Services Co., 732 P.2d 1260, 1268
(Kan. 1987).
183. 666 P.2d 192 (Kan. 1983).
184. Id. at 201.
185. Haysville S.D. No. 261 v. GAF Corp. Accord Scott v. Strickland, 691 P.2d 45 (Kan.
App. 1984).
186. 600 P.2d 725 (Wyo. 1979).
187. Id. at 731-32.
188. Id. at 731.
189. Id. at 731.
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plumber's answer asserted tort defenses.190 The trial court without
explanation found that the improper installation resulted in breach of
contract and negligence liability.191 The Wyoming Supreme Court
held that "[w]here negligence on the part of the contractor results in a
breach of [the warranty of workmanlike performance], a cause of ac-
tion ex contractu and a tortious action premised on negligence, or
both, are available to the contractuee."192
Any doubts at to the availability of a tort action for breach of'the
warranty of workmanlike performance in Wyoming were recently re-
moved in Schneider National, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co.3 93 There the
Wyoming Supreme Court explained and accordingly limited its hold-
ing in Cline. The court stated that the specific negligence in Cline
consisted of the injury to the builder's property accruing from im-
proper workmanship.194 This, according to the court, gave rise to a
tort action and transformed the action from one based on contract to
one which lies in ex contractu, ex delicto, or both. Thus the court
viewed breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance as cogni-
zable in tort only when a duty is breached independent of the contract.
The essence of the court's conclusion is that the warranty of work-
manlike performance does not give rise to an independent duty absent
damage to other property. The court's focus on the nature of the re-
sulting injury and the interest sought to be protected as determining
the circumstances under which breach of the warranty will present a
tort claim was buttressed by its reaffirmance of the rule that purely
economic loss is not recoverable in tort.195
ii. Summary
Although Kansas, Wyoming, and other courts may broadly hold
that breach of the workmanlike performance warranty gives rise to
both contract and tort causes of action, the availability of the latter is
typically limited to situations involving damage or loss to property
other than the subject matter of the transaction. In such instances,
the service provider is deemed to have breached an independent duty,
separate and distinct from the workmanlike performance warranty
which alone merely gives rise to a contract cause of action. 196 Other
190. Id.
191. Id. at 732.
192. Id.
193. 843 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1992).
194. Id. at 585-86.
195. Id. at 586.
196. This interpretation finds support in Ware v. Christenberry, 637 P.2d 452, 455
(Kan. App. 1981), where breach of the breach of the warranty of workmanlike
performance was recognized as giving rise to both tort and contract claims. The
court noted, however, that the applicability of the foregoing rule depended on the
nature of the interest sought to be protected. See, Grey v. Bradford-White Corp.,
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courts arrive at the same conclusion by focusing on whether the dam-
ages claimed constitute economic loss. Yet the gist of the inquiry is
the same-absent the existence of a duty imposed by law to protect a
party against the risk of personal or property harm, a cause of action
will lie only in contract. However, other courts have employed an in-
dependent duty analysis only to find that breach of the warranty
sounds in tort and not contract. The discussion turns now to an exam-
ination of this category of cases.
d. Ex Delicto Only
i. Duties Implied in Law Rationale
Certain courts have examined the warranty of workmanlike per-
formance and conceptualized it as a tort concept. Courts employ vari-
ations on a central theme to reach this conclusion. This theme and the
resulting tort formulation of the warranty rests on the premise that
tort law is intended to protect against breaches of duties implied by
law. It is, therefore, assumed that inasmuch as the duty to perform in
a workmanlike manner is implied into agreements as a matter of law,
breach of the warranty gives rise to tort liability and remedies. The
operative effect of this reasoning is to treat a gap filler term as the
functional equivalent of a tort duty which is imposed as a matter of
public policy. Consistent with this premise is the conclusion that an
implied contractual term, which arises as a matter of law, necessarily
promotes an important public interest and therefore ought to give rise
to an independent tort obligation.
The notion that tort duties, operating independently of contractual
obligations, are created when a contract incorporates a general stan-
dard of performance because of the contracting parties' failure to ex-
pressly so provide, surfaced in Securities-Intermountain, Inc. v.
Sunset Fuel Co.197 There the assignee of a general contractor sued an
architect and subcontractor for the installation of a defective heating
system. Plaintiff sought damages, inter alia, for the costs of redesign-
ing the system and costs associated with delay. Plaintiff alleged no
injury to persons or other property.
581 F. Supp. 725, 728 (D. Kan. 1984)(products liability action for breach of warran-
ties, express or implied, gives rise to tort action only if a duty imposed by law such
as that to guard against injury to persons or property is implicated). Maryland
courts appear also to have indirectly adopted the economic loss rule in holding
that breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance gives rise to a contract
action except where the failure results in injury to persons or property or poses a
risk of harm to persons or property. Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condomin-
ium v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 517 A.2d 336 (Md. App. 1986); Gaybis v.
Palm, 93 A.2d 269 (Md. App. 1952); Sims v. Ryland Group, Inc., 378 A.2d 1 (Md.
App. 1977).
197. 611 P.2d 1158, 1169 (Or. 1980).
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Defendant sought to characterize plaintiffs action as sounding in
tort rather than contract in order to assert the two year tort statute of
limitations.198 As background for its decision, the court initially re-
viewed a number of cases from other jurisdictions articulating varying
approaches taken by courts in attempting to determine the substan-
tive nature of the cause of action. The court initially noted that the
nature of the damages demanded may impact the characterization of
an action as tort or contract.199 To this it added that characterization
of an action as tort or contract may rest on whether or not the parties'
agreement incorporates a general standard of care or expressly
prescribes the applicable standard of care. It concluded that where
the contract incorporates by reference or implication a general stan-
dard of care to which a party would be bound independent of the con-
tract, breach of such a duty is noncontractual. Conversely, if the
parties articulate in the contract the performance expected, failure to
comply would render a party liable in contract.200
The court concluded that the parties had expressly spelled out the
architect's obligations in detail. Therefore, the action sounded in con-
tract since it was unnecessary to incorporate the generally applicable
standard of care into the agreement.201 Finally, as dictum, the court
concluded the phrase "unworkmanlike performance" is a general
standard and therefore "appears to invoke a negligence standard or
general professional duty of care and skill rather than a contractual
standard."202 The court's dictum suggests that breach of the duty to
perform in a workmanlike manner gives rise to a tort cause of action
when it is necessary to imply it as a general standard of care into an
agreement.
The Oregon Supreme Court recently clarified any confusion cre-
ated by its dictum in Securities-Intermountain. In Georgetown Realty,
Inc. v. Home Insurance Co.,203 the court explained its reasoning and
the result reached in Securities-Intermountain. It first concluded
that even though a relationship may arise out of contract, an injured
party may sue in tort if the breaching party is subject to a standard of
care independent of the express terms of the contract.2 04
The court next outlined the circumstances in which such an in-
dependent duty might arise. "If the plaintiff's claim is based solely on
a breach of a provision in the contract, which itself spells out the
party's obligation, then the remedy normally will be only in contract,
198. Id. at 1163.
199. Id. at 1167.
200. Id. at 1167.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1169.
203. 831 P.2d 7 (Ore. 1991).
204. Id. at 12.
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with contract measures of damages and contract statutes of limita-
tion."205 Thus the court indirectly reaffirmed the conceptually flawed
conclusion in Securities-Intermountain that failure to specifically de-
scribe the manner of performance will give rise to a tort action.206
Analogous reasoning was employed in National Fire Insurance Co.
v. Westgate Construction Co.,207 wherein a federal district court con-
cluded that Delaware courts would hold that breach of the implied
duty to perform in a good and workmanlike manner creates concur-
rent tort and contract remedies. 208 Plaintiff alleged improper per-
formance by a contractor retained to construct a fireplace. The
warranty of workmanlike performance was characterized as "an im-
plied condition or duty," establishing the manner in which services
were to be rendered. As such, an action lie in both tort and contract
for failure to perform up to the standard.2 09 The basis underlying this
conclusion was set forth in a footnote wherein the court stated a tort
action for breach of a duty imposed by law which arises independently
of the express contract terms (the warranty of workmanlike perform-
ance) would not be precluded simply because the duty arose from the
205. Id.
206. Other courts have the followed the approach or one similar to that which has
been adopted in Oregon. In Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Service
Co., 427 P.2d 833, 841-42 (Alaska 1967), plaintiff sued for negligent repair services.
The court first concluded that whether the action sounded in tort or contract, the
standard for determining breach would be the same. This standard, the duty to
exercise skill and workmanlike performance, was imposed as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff's action lie in tort. Id. at 841-42. It is
worthy of mention that notwithstanding the foregoing conclusion, the court dis-
tinguished duties arising out of contract and independent tort duties imposed as a
matter of social policy. This and other language in the opinion suggest the court
recognized a principle akin to the economic loss doctrine.
Accord St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sauer Elec., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 959,
961 (D. Alaska) (gravamen of action alleging breach of duty imposed by law to
perform in workmanlike manner is tort); Bowen & Bowen, Inc. v. McCoy-Gib-
bons, 363 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. App. 1987)(interpreting the warranty of workmanlike
performance to create a duty independent of contractual obligations and there-
fore giving rise to a tort cause of action); accord Sam Finley, Inc. v. Barnes, 275
S.E.2d 380, 382 (Ga. App. 1980). But see Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942
(11th Cir. 1982)(concluding that apparently conflicting Georgia appellate court
opinions which addressed whether a failure to perform in a workmanlike manner
gives rise to a tort action can be reconciled to hold that nature of damages suf-
fered determines whether a suit may be brought in both tort and contract); Ar-
den Hills N. Homes Assoc. v. Pemton, Inc., 475 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (contractor has a duty independent of the contract itself, to erect a building
in a reasonably good and workmanlike manner). See George B. Gilmore Co. v.
Garrett, 582 So.2d 387, 391 (Miss. 1991)(breach of the common law duty to per-
form with care, skill and reasonable experience, which arises by operation of law
is a tort as well as a breach of contract)(citations omitted).
207. 227 F. Supp. 835, 837 (D. Del. 1964).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 838.
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contractual relation."210
ii. Warranty of Habitability Rationale
We must include within the foregoing category of cases finding
breach of the warranty gives rise to actions ex delicto, those in which
courts fail sufficiently to distinguish between the concepts embodied
in the warranty of habitability versus a warranty of workmanlike per-
formance. Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc., is representa-
tive of this group of cases.21 1 There the Ohio Supreme Court held that
an action alleging the failure of a builder-vendor to construct a com-
pleted residence in a workmanlike manner gives rise to a tort rather
than a contract cause of action.2 1 2 The court's conclusion was
grounded on the premise that the warranty of workmanlike perform-
ance is imposed by law as a matter of public policy.
The court's logic is sound to the extent that the warranty of work-
manlike performance is elevated to something akin to the warranty of
habitability, which is precisely what occurred in Velotta. The court
refused to characterize the duty which a builder-vendor owes to a
home purchaser as an implied warranty of habitability. Rather it
chose to label the builder-vendor's duty vis-a-vis a the owner of a com-
pleted residence as an obligation to perform in a workmanlike man-
ner. The following reasoning supported the court's conclusion that
the action arises ex delicto:
The duty implied in the sale between the builder-vendor and the immediate
vendee is the duty imposed by law on all persons to exercise ordinary care. In
an action [alleging poor workmanship] ... the essential allegation is, viz, the
builder-vendor's negligence proximately caused the vendee's damages. The
action, therefore, arise ex delicto .... The obligation to perform in a workman-
like manner using ordinary care may arise from or out of a contract, i.e., from
the purchase agreement, but the cause of action is not based on contract;
210. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Westgate Constr. Co., 227 F. Supp. 835, 838, n.4 (D. Del.
1964). Still other courts find that a failure to perform in a workmanlike manner
gives rise to a tort action based upon the notion that it is a duty implied in law and
since duties implied in law are tortious in nature, the breach of the workmanship
warranty gives rise to a tort cause of action. This proposition was adopted in
Lucas v. Canadian Valley Area Vocational Technical School, 824 P.2d 1140 (Okla.
App. 1992).
211. Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, 433 N.E.2d 147 (Ohio 1982).
212. Velotta has been followed by subsequent decisions in Ohio. Courts applying
Velotta refuse to create a warranty that a structure when completed will be suita-
ble for its intended purpose. They conclude, however, that a duty is implied by
law that a builder-seller of a completed residence will construct the residence in a
workmanlike manner. This duty gives rise to an action ex delicto. In certain in-
stances, courts have extended the applicability of Velotta beyond claims alleging
failure of a builder-vendor to construct a completed residence in workmanlike
manner. See infra discussion and cases cited in note 213.
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rather it is based on a duty imposed by law.2
1 3
As noted above, the characterization of the builder-vendor's obliga-
tion to perform in a workmanlike manner as a basis for tort liability is
correct if viewed from the perspective that the obligation embodies
the concept typically denominated as an implied warranty of habita-
bility, which is a duty imposed pursuant to public policy considera-
213. Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, 433 N.E.2d 147, 150 (Ohio 1982).
The Velotta court limited its holding to cases involving the sale of a completed
structure. Subsequent intermediate Ohio appellate decisions disagree on whether
failure to perform in a workmanlike manner gives rise to a contract or tort action
in cases other than those involving the sale of a completed structure. For in-
stance, in Elizabeth Gamble Deaconess Home Ass'n v. Turner Constr. Co., 470
N.E.2d 950 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984), the court extended the reasoning in Velotta to
hold that plaintiff's assertion that defendant breached its implied warranty of
workmanlike performance in the erection of a garage gave rise to a tort cause of
action and, therefore, the tort rather than contract statute of limitations applied.
Id. at 956-57. The court noted "[wihile the Supreme Court reserved the question
of the applicability of [the tort statute of limitations] to a claim arising from negli-
gence in future construction work .... we believe the logical extension of the
holding that the implied warranty of good workmanship as to a completed resi-
dence creates a right in tort must apply to the same warranty as to future con-
struction." Id. at 957. Similarly, in Ohio Historical Soc'y v. General Maintenance
& Eng'g Co., 583 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), the court held that the failure to
perform roofing repair services in a workmanlike manner sounds in tort and not
in contract. Accord Kirk v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 534 N.E.2d 1235, 1236 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1987)(breach of implied warranty to construct in a workmanlike manner
gives rise to a tort action where relationship involved contract to construct shell
of a residence).
Other courts have rejected the foregoing reasoning. In Barton v. Ellis, 518
N.E.2d 18 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986), the court refused to extend the Velotta character-
ization of the workmanlike performance warranty beyond cases involving the
sale of completed structure. There a contractor entered into a contract to re-
model the plaintiff's home. After numerous problems developed, the plaintiffs
filed suit seeking the cost of repair. In concluding that the action arose ex con-
tractu, the court stated "[a]bsent express or implied warranties as to the quality
or fitness of work performed, the liability of a builder-vendor of a completed
structure for failure to exercise reasonable care to perform in a workmanlike
manner sounds in tort, and arises ex delicto. The essential allegation is that the
builder-vendor's negligence proximately causes the vendee's damages. (citations
omitted). By contrast, in the provision of future services, liability arises ex con-
tractu as an implied bargain, provision, condition, or term of sale." (emphasis sup-
plied). Id. at 18, 20. The Barton court relied upon Vandershirier v. Aaron, 140
N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957), and Mitchem v. Johnson, 218 N.E.2d 594
(Ohio 1966) which viewed the warranty of workmanlike performance as an im-
plied term or condition of a contract. Accord Lloyd v. William Fannin Builders,
Inc., 320 N.E.2d 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973)(the duty imposed to build structures in a
workmanlike manner arises from an implied bargain, an implied provision, an
implied condition, or an implied term; it is a duty which is implied in law and
comes from the contract between the builder-vendor); see Cincinnati Gas & Elec.
Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49,60-61 (S.D. Ohio 1986)(duty to perform in
workmanlike manner creates a contract cause of action and not tort since the
breach of such a duty is not breach of a duty independent of those which arise by
virtue of the contract)(emphasis added).
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tions. In Velotta, however, grounds for characterizing the action as a
tort were undercut by Ohio precedent in which the Ohio Supreme
Court had found that the builder-vendor's duty arose out of a contract
of sale and not out of a general duty owed to the public at large.X4
More importantly, the court's characterization of the duty illus-
trates the conceptual implications flowing from the definition given
the concept typically referred to as the warranty of habitability. In
Velotta, the doctrinal definition given the warranty of workmanlike
performance depended on the doctrinal definition given the concept
normally referred to as a warranty of habitability. Apparently the
court was unable to distinguish between an implied warranty of habit-
ability and an implied warranty of workmanlike construction. As
pointed out by one commentator:
The essential assertion is not that the builder vendor's negligence proximately
caused the vendee's damages, but that the vendee did not receive what he bar-
gained for-quality workmanship. The builder implicitly warrants that he
will use ordinary care and skill and insure quality workmanship, and the ven-
dee agrees to compensate the builder for this warranty. If a defect occurs that
was caused by the builder's failure to exercise ordinary care, the builder ven-
dor has violated this warranty. The action, therefore is ex contractu.... Ap-
parently the court was unable to distinguish between an implied warranty of
habitability and an implied warranty of workmanlike construction. To avoid
extending an implied warranty of habitability, the result which would make
the builder an insurer, the court felt it had to use tort language.2 1 5
In short, courts have reached divergent formulations of the war-
ranty of workmanlike performance. Moreover, the doctrinal basis of
the warranty is often defined differently even though courts deploy
the same approach, such as an independent duty approach. This ap-
pears due in part to divergent views as to the underlying nature of the
warranty of workmanlike performance.
E. Application of Gap Filler Conceptualization
1. Evaluating the Independent Duty Approach
The immediately preceding discussion illustrates the substantial
degree of inconsistency resulting from application of the independent
duty analysis as a means of determining the substantive cause or
causes of action available for breach of the warranty of workmanlike
performance. The foregoing survey also demonstrates that application
214. Insurance Co. of N.Am., v. Bonnie Built Homes, 416 N.E.2d 623, 624 (Ohio 1980);
Mitchem v. Johnson, 218 N.E.2d 594 (Ohio 1966). To this extent, the Velotta court
intended to provide the types of protections afforded by the warranty of habita-
bility for the reasons typically stated, its willingness to ignore existing precedent
appears sound.
215. David J. Strasser, Extension of Implied Warranties to Subsequent Purchasers of
Real Property: Insurance Co. of North America v. Bonnie Built Homes, 43 OHIO
ST. L.J. 951, 956-58 (1982).
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of the independent duty approach serves as a convenient mechanism
to avoid addressing considerations pertinent to assessing the substan-
tive nature of the warranty of workmanlike performance. As dis-
cussed below, accepting the premise that the warranty or
workmanlike performance constitutes a gap filler may facilitate
broader evaluation of these considerations.
Most courts which conclude that, since the warranty of workman-
like performance creates an independent duty imposed by law, its
breach should gives rise to a negligence action, typically fail to engage
in the weighing of interests which has traditionally served as a predi-
cate for recognizing the existence or creation of duties giving rise to a
negligence cause of action. In deciding whether to impose liability for
negligence, courts, particularly modern courts, have generally drawn
upon rationales of fairness and deterrence embedded in tort law's neg-
ligence tradition and upon the modern loss-distribution rationale.2 1 6
The broad considerations are aimed at determining whether society as
a matter of public policy deems a plaintiff's interests worthy of protec-
tion from a defendant's conduct.217 Often courts consider these fac-
tors in the context of duty analysis which is a means for determining
whether to protect a plaintiffs interest by virtue of a negligence ac-
tion.2 18 As articulated by one court:
In the decision of whether or not there is a duty, many factors interplay:
the hand of history, our ideals of morals and justice, the convenience of ad-
ministration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall.
In the end the court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the
mores of the community, always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to
make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general
understanding of mankind.2 19
216. Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992).
217. KEETON ET AL., supra note 8 at 357-58.
218. Prior to 1960, the concept of duty was frequently deployed by courts as a means of
denying negligence liability. Schwartz, supra note 216 at 658. Professor Schwartz
concludes that although use of this approach receded after 1960, since 1980 there
has been a resurgence in the deployment of a duty approach to determining negli-
gence liability and more often than not as a means of denying such liability. Id. at
659-60. See note 219, infra for illustrations of cases employing duty analysis.
See also, KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 357, wherein it is suggested that
focusing on the existence or non-existence of a duty begs the question. "[D]uty is
only a conclusion embodying policies making a defendant civilly liable for failure
to protect a plaintiff against an injury." Donaca v. Curry County, 734 P.2d 1339,
1342 (Or. 1987).
219. Trusiani v. Cumberland & York Distribs., Inc., 538 A.2d 258, 261 (Me. 1988).
Other courts focus on factors such as those articulated in Trusiani to determine
whether to impose negligence liability on a defendant. See, e.g., Cottam v. First
Baptist Church of Boulder, 756 F. Supp. 1433, 1437 (D. Colo. 1991); Vu v. Singer
Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Wright v. City of Los Angeles, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 309, 326 (1990); Deibert v. Bauer Bros. Constr. Co., Inc. 566 N.E.2d 239, 243
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Only in a few discrete instances, most notably Texas,220 have
courts engaged in this type of weighing of interests in characterizing
the obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner as an independent
tortious duty. And to the extent that after the principal policy consid-
erations are taken into account, a conclusion that the warranty consti-
tutes an independent tort duty is objectionable only if one disagrees
with the relative weight afforded the competing interests.
However, the overwhelming majority of decisions in which the
warranty of workmanlike performance is deemed to give rise to a neg-
ligence action which operates independent of contractual obligations
fail to engage in this thorough and necessary form of analysis. The
superficial analysis employed no doubt contributes to the conceptually
flawed reasoning which can be described as follows. Since the obliga-
tion to perform in a workmanlike manner is a term implied by law, it
logically follows that it amounts to an independent duty which gives
rise to a tort cause of action upon its breach. The fact that the parties
have entered into a contract is not crucial to the viability of this duty.
The implications of such reasoning are several. First, as stated
above, courts are engaged in the process of creating negligence liability
without weighing competing policy interests. Failure to engage in a
thorough consideration of whether to impose a duty may result in su-
perficial consideration of factors and concepts such as the economic
loss rule and the differences in the respective functions served by tort
and contract.
This reasoning also highlights the misunderstanding of the under-
lying basis of the warranty of workmanlike performance, in particular
its function as a gap filler provision. This misunderstanding in turn
tends to delegitimize and constrict the function of this and, indirectly,
other gap filler provisions. In addition, this approach fails to recognize
that the mere incorporation of a standard for determining perform-
ance into an agreement does not automatically elevate the standard to
providing the basis for tort liability and thereby transform its underly-
ing nature.
To reiterate, the warranty of workmanlike performance defines
the level of performance expected when the parties fail to provide in
(Ill. 1990); Phillips v. City of Billings, 758 P.2d 772, 775 (Mont. 1988); Greater
Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990).
220. Texas courts have tended to thoroughly consider and weigh the competing policy
interests implicated by expanding the applicability of the warranty of workman-
like performance. For instance, the weighing of such interests has appropriately
led courts to characterize the warranty of workmanlike performance in the con-
text of repair services as more tortious in nature than contractual. The court's
discussion of the reasons underlying its application of a warranty of workmanlike
performance to repair services in Melody Homes provides just such an example.
See also discussion accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
1038 [Vol. 72:981
1993] WARRANTY OF WORKMANLIKE PERFORMANCE 1039
the express terms of the contract.22 1 In this sense, it does not create
an independent duty cognizable in tort any more than the implied
duty to perform a contract within a reasonable period of time when
the parties fail to specify a time for performance would ordinarily give
rise to a tort action for such a failure.
Moreover, this approach tends to penalize parties with a tort action
when they fail to specify in their contract the manner in which they
are obligated to perform. This is contrary to contract theory which
acknowledges and accepts contractual incompleteness as a reality of
commercial transactions and of contract law.222 Imposing a tort obli-
gation on those parties who fail to expressly provide for a manner of
performance in determining breach shifts inordinate risks to such par-
ties. It is also inconsistent with the generally recognized premise that
default rules/gap filler provisions are not only efficient in that they
result in lower transaction costs, but also comport with commercial
realities.223 It imposes the sanction of tort liability on parties who en-
gage in conduct considered acceptable and expected in the commercial
context.224
Characterization of the warranty of workmanlike performance as a
gap filler perhaps shifts the focus from the nature of the injury to the
policies related to the utility of gap fillers and the underlying assump-
tion that parties enter into contracts without fully expressing all
terms and attempting to provide for each and every contingency which
may arise.225 At a minimum, the characterization of the warranty as a
gap filler should require analysis of these issues as well as those aris-
ing in the context of the traditional distinctions between tort and
contract. 22 6
In summary, a service provider's obligations pursuant to an implied
warranty of workmanlike performance are not founded in the breach
of a general public duty, imposed by law, to use due care which creates
a tort claim. Rather, the obligations and liabilities rest in contract,
arising either from express promises or promises implied in law based
on the factual relationship between the parties. Conceptualizing the
implied warranty of workmanlike performance sharpens this distinc-
tion and requires courts to explicitly address public policy considera-
tions relevant to the creation of an independent duty for breach of the
warranty of workmanlike performance.
221. See supr text accompanying notes 5871.
222. See supra text accompanying note 68.
223. See supa text accompanying note 67.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 197-210.
225. See supra text accompanying note 68.
226. Indeed it is arguable that the policies which encourage the use of background
rules and their efficient operation may in and of themselves provide sufficient
justification for denying tort recovery for breach of the warranty of workmanlike
performance.
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2. Evaluating the Economic Loss Approach
Similar observations can be made with respect to the economic loss
rule. As alluded to above, the economic loss doctrine has been relied
on by courts to support a contractual characterization of the warranty
of workmanlike performance. As is true of the independent duty
rationale, of which it is a corollary, the economic loss approach has
proved to be deficient as a mechanism for determining the substantive
basis of actions for breach of the warranty of workmanlike
performance.
The economic loss rule operates to preclude the recovery of purely
economic loss under tort principles. Economic loss has been defined
as connoting "all losses except those from personal injury or damage
to property other than the allegedly defective property."227 Under the
doctrine, the availability of tort remedies is contingent on the presence
of personal injury or damage to other property, 228 as opposed to dam-
age or injury which is limited to the item which is the subject of a
227. Michael D. Leider, Constructing a New Action for Negligent Infliction of Eco-
nomic Loss: Building on Cardoza and Coase, WASH. L. REV. 937, 938 n.1 (1991).
Economic loss has been specifically defined to include diminution in value of an
item due to its defectiveness, the costs of repair or replacement, loss of use, and
loss of profits and good will. Leider, supra. Similarly in Anderson Elect. v. Led-
better Erection Corp., 503 N.E.2d 246, 247 (Ill. 1986), economic loss was defined to
include damages for "inadequate value, costs of repair, and replacement of the
defective product or consequent loss of profits, without any claim of personal in-
jury or damage to other property." Accord, Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of
Economic Loss in Tort for Construction Defects: A Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L.
REV. 891, 895 (1989)(Economic loss occurs when a product is of inferior quality or
fails to work for its intended purpose); Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 620
So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 1993)("economic losses are 'disappointed economic expecta-
tions,' which are protected by contract law, rather than tort law"); Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 449 (Ill. 1982)(defining economic loss as
"damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective
product, or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or
damage to other property).
228. The presence of damage to other property determines whether economic loss can
be brought within the ambit of those damages and interests which the law in the
form of tort theory protects against infringement. Barrett, supra note 227, at 896.
The conceptualizations of what constitutes damage to other property are varied.
See William Powers, Jr. & Margaret Niver, Negligence, Breach of Contrac and
the "Economic Loss" Rule, 23 TEX. TECH L. REv. 477, 481 (1992)(noting the disa-
greement concerning the boundaries of property and economic loss).
In East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858
(1986), a maritime dispute regarding a defective product, the Supreme Court sum-
marized the three prevalent approaches employed to determine if a products lia-
bility action is cognizable when a product injures only itself: a) no recovery in
tort if damage is purely monetary and only product itself is damaged; b) tort re-
covery permitted if defective product creates a potential danger to persons or
other property even though loss is only to product itself; and c) tort recovery
permitted for injury to product itself regardless of whether defect creates risk of
harm.
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contractual relationship.229 Consequently, the "economic loss doc-
trine states that when only the work product itself is damaged as a
result of its defective nature, the damage is defined as 'economic'
rather than as 'property damages' and is not recoverable in tort."230
The theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine have been described
as follows:
The economic loss doctrine marks the fundamental boundary between con-
tract law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy interests of the parties,
and tort law, which imposes a duty of reasonable care and thereby encourages
citizens to avoid causing physical harm to others. Simply stated, the economic
loss doctrine holds that one may not recover "economic" losses under a tort
theory.... The crux of the doctrine... is the premise that economic interests
are protected, if at all, by contract principles, rather than tort principles.2 3 1
In the construction context, the economic loss doctrine arises as a
barrier to the successful assertion of tort claims in two factual settings.
First, a nonparticipant in the construction process, such as a tenant,
sues a participant with whom it lacks contractual privity for economic
losses resulting from the latter's supposed improper performance.232
The recovery of economic loss in this setting has been challenged on
grounds that tort law's policing mechanism for limiting recovery, the
foreseeability limitation, functions ineffectively to limit a defendant's
potential liability for economic losses.233 Another reason offered in
favor of the economic loss rule focuses on the presumably better posi-
tion of plaintiffs than defendants to evaluate the former's susceptibil-
ity to pure economic loss and to protect against it through first-party
insurance.234
Second, the economic loss doctrine arises as an issue when a party
to a contract or a participant in the construction process such as a con-
tractor or subcontractor sues an architect or engineer for economic
losses allegedly caused by another participant such as an architect or
engineer.235 Proponents of the application of the economic loss rule in
this setting argue that the bargaining process in the contractual con-
229. Barrett, supra note 227, at 896.
230. Id. at 896-97.
231. Id. at 894-96.
232. See Leider, supra note 125, at 939. In this factual setting, the parties are strangers
to the transaction. Id.
233. Powers & Niver, supra note 228, at 481.
234. Id. at 481-82. "Related to this rationale is the argument that businesses vary in
their susceptibility to economic loss. Thus, a rule favoring liability benefits some
businesses more than others. To the extent that everyone ultimately shares in
the cost of liability through third party insurance premiums or higher prices for
goods and services, a rule favoring liability effects a subsidy from low-susceptibil-
ity plaintiffs to high-susceptibility plaintiffs." Id.
235. Thus the doctrine applies both to parties to a contractual relationship as well as
to those situations involving parties who are indirect parties to the particular
transaction even though they are not technically in contractual privity. Powers &
Niver, supra note 228, at 482.
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text is a preferable mechanism for allocating risk for loss of expec-
tancy than tort law which is premised on social norms.236 Thus the
doctrine is said to operate to prevent disproportionate liability and
protect freedom of contract by permitting the parties to allocate their
risks contractually.2 3 7 Finally, the use of the doctrine is no doubt mo-
tivated by the desire simply to honor the traditional spheres of con-
tract which concerns itself with bargains and expectations and tort
which concerns itself with harm caused to persons and property.23 8
The debate and resulting controversy generated by the varying po-
236. Powers & Niver, supra note 228, at 482. Powers and Niver argue, however, that a
sound argument can be advanced that tort law concepts provides a suitable basis
for assigning risks as does forcing the parties to assign risks pursuant to their
contracts. Powers & Niver, supra note 228 at 488.
Professor Barrett maintains, however, that a deleterious effect of permitting
the recovery of economic loss in tort in the construction context is to impose in-
crementally greater costs on society which would be internalized and allocated
among consumers of construction related services. Barrett, supra note 227 at 933.
Requiring the consuming public as a whole to bear the cost of economic losses
suffered by those failing to bargain for adequate contractual remedies in the con-
struction context has been criticized as imprudent for at least three reasons: a)
owners are capable of protecting themselves contractually; b) practical obstacles
such as the inability of contractors to obtain liability insurance for economic loss,
impede shifting the risk of economic losses; and c) judicially administering a duty
to prevent economic loss will be extremely difficult. Barrett, supra note 227 at
933-38.
Consistent with this view are those articulated by Judge Posner who, in re-
jecting a tort claim for economic loss in Rardin v. T. & D. Mach. Handling, 890
F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1989), reasoned that the doctrine operates as a mechanism which
permits business persons to distribute risks as they see fit. Id. at 29. He argued
that contract law permits a potential victim to bargain for suitable and alternative
arrangements. 1d. at 29-30. But see William C. Way, Note, The Problem of Eco-
nomic Damages: Reconceptualizing the Moorman Doctrine, U. ILL. L. REV. 1169
(1991) (arguing that Posner's assertions are sound only in situations where parties
are in contractual privity and therefore have the opportunity to enter into alter-
native protective arrangements. Where privity is lacking the opportunity to con-
tractually allocate risks is unavailable).
237. Lieder, supra note 125 at 940-41. Lieder concludes that these and other reasons
fail, when subjected to critical analysis, to justify adequately rejection of tort
claims for economic loss. Applying an economic analysis, he urges the creation of
a direct cause of action for the recovery of economic loss. In the construction
context, "such as action should protect the injured party's reliance on the
builder's services; it should restrict the parties who can sue to a limited group of
persons whose reliance the builder could particularly foresee; and it should limit
the builder's exposure to a reasonable, defined period of time, and the recover-
able damages to those reasonably foreseeable by the builder." Id. at 992-93.
238. Jones, supra note 116 at 1058. While noting the desire to maintain tradition, Pro-
fessor Jones properly concludes substantive concerns are also at issue. Contract
is more sensitive to variables, such as variations in quality and price, which might
be overlooked in tort. He provides the following illustration. A buyer paying a
low price for a minimal structure should not be able to assert in tort that it lacked
the standard features common in the industry or in a more expensive structure.
Jones, supra note 116 at 1058. Professor Jones concludes that while tort may be
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sitions239 on the wisdom of the economic loss rule have influenced
some courts to relax application of the doctrine.240 Nevertheless, the
doctrine continues to be employed in some form in virtually all
states.2 4 ' This has resulted in the invariably inconsistent applications
of the doctrine and, at times, an absence of coherent reasoning sup-
porting application or non-application of the doctrine.24 2
When courts adopt an economic loss approach as the mechanism
adapted to address such an issue by the creation of an appropriate standard of
care, contract is a preferred mechanism. Jones, supra note 116 at 1058.
In East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986),
the United States Supreme Court recognized the differences between the com-
peting regimes of contract and tort. In this matter involving a defective product
in the maritime context, the court concluded "[w]hen a product injures only itself
the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to
its contractual remedies are strong." Id at 871. The reasons referred to by the
court for not recognizing extracontractual remedies included the ability of com-
mercial parties contractually to allocate between themselves the risks of defects.
Id. at 872-73. It further added that a commercial party can always insure against
the risk posed. More fundamentally, the court reasoned that extra contractual
remedies are not justified inasmuch as the injury suffered when a product fails
properly to function is the essence of a warranty action which provides the mech-
anism for pursing the benefit of the bargain. Id. at 867-68.
In another maritime case, Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Avondale, 866 F.2d 752
(5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit extended the rule and reasoning of East River to
a contract to provide professional services. Focusing on the ability of commercial
parties to allocate risks of defective performance, the court refused to permit the
plaintiff to recover a purely economic loss pursuant to a theory of negligent per-
formance of a contract for professional services. Id at 765. The court noted the
Supreme Court's concern as expressed in East River for preserving the integrity
of contract law in the commerical context is equally applicable to professional
services where the defect is only to the product itself. Id. at 762.
239. For citations to arguments proposed by proponents and opponents of the eco-
nomic loss rule see Lieder, supra note 125 at 939 n.3; Powers & Niver, supra note
228, at 481 (noting the controversial nature of the economic loss rule).
240. See Powers & Niver, supra note 228 at 481.
241. Powers & Niver, supra note 228 at 481; see Lieder, supra note 125, at 952-54.
242. See generally Lieder, supra note 125, and Barrett, supra note 227 (describing the
inconsistency in judicial application of the doctrine). Typically courts adopt one
of three approaches in applying the economic loss doctrine. Most jurisdictions
have adopted the rule enunciated in Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal.
1965) which precludes the recovery of economic loss in tort. Others align with
the contrasting view expressed in Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d
304 (N.J. 1965), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court permitted a consumer to
sue in strict liability to recover economic loss associated with a defective carpet.
(In Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985),
the court refused to extend Santor to commercial transactions). What has been
defined as an intermediate position has been adopted by other jurisdictions.
Under the intermediate position, economic loss is recoverable if the loss was occa-
sioned by a defect which created a potential danger to persons or property. Thus
in Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977) damage to the product itself
was recoverable under strict liability in tort where the injury resulted from a fire.
See generally, East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delavel, Inc., 476 U.S.
858 (1986)(describing the three approaches taken by jurisdictions).
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for determining the substantive causes of action available for breach
of the warranty of workmanlike performance, an opportunity exists
for analysis and exploration of the distinctions between tort and con-
tract. Yet critical analysis of such distinctions and their implications is
often lacking.243 Even in instances where a court undertakes a thor-
ough analysis it often fails to focus on the underlying nature and pur-
poses behind the implication of the workmanlike performance
obligation into agreements. It therefore fails to consider related issues
such as the efficiency of gap fillers and the implications for permitting
tort recovery for breach of such a term. This, and the uneven applica-
tion of the economic loss doctrine, limit its usefulness as a means of
achieving not only greater predictability but for understanding the
complete realm of theoretical, policy, and practical considerations im-
plicated by the warranty of workmanlike performance.
Arguably, by shifting the focus of analysis to these considerations
in determining whether to permit an action in tort, one can avoid cer-
tain problems associated with the inconsistent results involved in de-
termining whether to apply the economic loss rule so as to preclude
actions in tort.244 Yet a prerequisite to doing so is to formulate the
warranty in a way that precisely defines its doctrinal basis and
content.
Formulating the implied warranty of workmanlike performance as
a gap filler or default rule may assist in accomplishing this goal. First,
such a formulation seems doctrinally sound. In addition, at a mini-
mum, such a characterization will add another level of factors for
courts to consider in determining whether to permit action in tort for
breach of the warranty. Certain of these factors will intersect with
policy considerations examined in assessing the relative benefits and
deleterious effects of the economic loss doctrine. Yet characterization
of the warranty of workmanlike performance brings into considera-
tion additional factors such as those which argue in favor of the wide-
spread use of background rules. Without engaging in a complete
consideration of all relevant factors, it is difficult for a court to assess
the ramifications of transformation of a contractually implied back-
ground rule into a premise for the imposition of tort liability.
243. See Barrett, supra note 228 (discussing the extent to which some courts which
adopt or refuse to adopt the economic loss doctrine neglect to provide rationales
for such determinations).
244. As pointed out by one commentator:
Historically, it is clear that tort law never imposed a duty on the part of
construction contractors to protect owners from economic losses arising
form buildings that lose their value or require repairs. As such, any deci-
sion to extend a tort duty to construction contractors is an exercise in
judicial policy-making and should be made only after weighing all com-
peting interests and policies....
Barrett, supra note 227 at 932.
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V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that uncertainty continues
to surround the precise doctrinal dimensions of the warranty of work-
manlike performance. This uncertainty has resulted in divergent for-
mulations of the concept. Varying conceptualizations of the warranty,
particularly of its it substantive basis, have produced unpredictable ju-
dicial determinations concerning procedure and rights available to
parties in when breach of the warranty is at issue.
Formulating the warranty of workmanlike performance as a gap
filler or default rule will not provide a panacea for all the issues which
courts address in the context of the warranty. A gap filler conceptual-
ization can assist courts in defining the precise doctrinal dimensions of
the warranty of workmanlike performance. As such it can also func-
tion as a point of departure for addressing the diverse issues which
arise out of the warranty of workmanlike performance.245 Ultimately
it may lead to greater predictability and more even application of the
warranty of workmanlike performance.
245. Although discussion of them is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted
that conceptualizing the warranty of workmanlike performance as a gap filler
may assist courts in addressing issues related to damages arising out of breach of
this obligation, what constitutes breach of this doctrine and the relationship be-
tween breach of the warranty and the substantial performance doctrine.
